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This dissertation contains three theoretical essays analyzing the incentives for
reporting and acquiring information.
The ﬁrst chapter explores how anonymity as a policy can be useful to induce
information revelation when commitment problems exist. I present a stylized
model of police soliciting crime tips from the general population, who are either
criminals or non-criminals. The police can implement one of two systems: (1)
anonymity and (2) non-anonymity. If the police can credibly commit to tracing
only a small fraction of the calls, then the system of non-anonymity yields the
best outcome for the police. However, if the police’s commitment is not credible,
then criminals correctly anticipate the police breaking their word and do not call.
Hence, given the existence of a commitment problem, the police are better oﬀ
implementing a system of anonymity. The second chapter argues that consumers
xiare better oﬀ with biased media ﬁrms rather than unbiased ones. To make such an
argument, I use a simple communication game between potentially biased experts
(media ﬁrms) and a decision maker (news consumers). In the game, information is
costly for experts to acquire, all parameters are common knowledge, and reported
information is veriﬁable. Upon characterizing the informative equilibria, in which
reports are fully revealing, I show that biased experts have a higher willingness
to pay for information than unbiased ones. In addition, competition among
experts further improves the welfare of the decision maker, and the size of those
improvements does not depend on having asymmetrically biased experts. The
third chapter explores whether the presence of multiple experts increases truthful
reporting through the framework of a repeated communication game between
informed experts and an uninformed decision maker. A strategic expert may lie to
inﬂuence the decision maker towards her own preferences. On the other hand, she
may report truthfully to maintain a reputation for being honest. Within certain
parameter ranges, there exists a unique symmetric, non-babbling, equilibrium,
in which all strategic experts randomize between reporting truthfully and lying.
Increasing the number of experts has two eﬀects: (i) it increases the probability
of truthful reporting, and (ii) it decreas e st h ea m o u n to fp a t i e n c er e q u i r e df o rt h e
existence of this mixed strategy equilibrium. As the number of experts approaches




People act diﬀerently when others are not watching. In particular, anonymity af-
fects human behavior. Much of the economics literature suggests that anonymity
would be socially damaging. A large literature has amassed based on the prob-
lems society faces precisely due to the fact that people behave diﬀerently when no
one is watching. Employees will shirk and people will behave opportunistically
if they are not monitored (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). Uncertainty about what
type of person (or ﬁrm) you are facing typically leads to less eﬃcient outcomes
than if you were certain.1 The welfare theorems depend on full information and
it has been shown that the lack of full information can invalidate those welfare
theorems (Stiglitz 2000). Furthermore, much of the literature on repeated games
informs us that having long-run players with histories allows the economy to
1A notable exception is Goldin and Rouse (2000). They show that employing blind orchestra
auditions increased the proportion of women orchestras. Here, when the directors’ preconceived
notions about types were wrong, concealing types improved the overall quality of the orchestra.
1achieve Pareto improving outcomes (Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin 1990). Co-
operative behavior is sustainable when you know who did what. Future treatment
of others, cooperation or punishment, can be conditioned on how one is currently
being treated.
Despite the fact that anonymity is typically viewed as socially damaging,
it can also lead to desirable outcomes that otherwise would not occur. Con-
sider the situations in which anonymity is employed. Voting is often anony-
mous. Anonymity is guaranteed to subjects who participate in experiments and
surveys. Teaching evaluations and similar critiques are often submitted anony-
mously. Anonymous H.I.V. testing is oﬀered by many health clinics. Police often
ask for anonymous tips from the general public to help solve crimes. The com-
mon link in these examples is that granting anonymity actually induces truthful
information revelation.
In this paper, I argue that anonymity can be used as a mechanism to induce
information revelation when commitment problems exist. An individual with
a regard for her future may not reveal private information if doing so leads to
negative consequences. For instance, an illegal immigrant may not call the police
with information about a serious crime in fear of being deported2.M o r e o v e r ,
2One way the Los Angeles Police Department has dealt with this issue is Special Order
40, "which prohibits oﬃcers from initiating contact with individuals for the sole purpose of
determining whether they are illegal immigrants.
The 29-year-old policy was designed to encourage illegal immigrants to cooperate with police
without fear of being deported." (Los Angeles Times, April 17, 2008)
2this illegal immigrant may fear retaliation from the criminals for being a snitch.
The commitment problem is on the part of the police. They are unable to fully
ensure that negative consequences from providing the information will not befall
the informant. Anonymity provides a resolution to this type of commitment
problem.
The model presented in this paper will focus on when citizens derive a per-
sonal beneﬁt from calling and not be concerned about problems associated with
the lack of accountability. In the police example it is clear how a lack of account-
ability is potentially problematic, however, it is not so clear in other examples.
For instance, anonymous H.I.V. testing does not suﬀer from the problem of lack
of accountability. Here, the patients personally beneﬁt from the knowledge about
whether or not they have contracted H.I.V., so that they can make better deci-
sions in their life. Relaxing this assumption is left for future research projects.
The personal beneﬁt is crucial, because with anonymity comes a lack of account-
ability. Implementing a system of anonymity may inadvertently invite criminals
to phone in erroneous tips. If the police are busy investigating false leads, then
they have less resources to devote to investigating the correct leads.
In order to develop my main point, I use a stylized example of police who
solicit crime tips from the general population. To solicit these crime tips, the
police may implement one of two systems: (1) anonymity and (2) non-anonymity.
3The system of anonymity does not allow the police to trace phone calls, while
the one of non-anonymity does.
The system of non-anonymity yields the best outcome for the police, but
only if the police can credibly commit to tracing a small fraction of the calls.
With credible commitment, the risk of being identiﬁed is suﬃciently low so that
a criminal won’t be deterred from calling. However, if the police’s commitment
is not credible, then the criminals correctly anticipate the police breaking their
word and do not call. Given the existence of a commitment problem, the police
are better oﬀ implementing a system of anonymity.
1.2 The Model
The players in this model are a single police player and a continuum of citizens
with mass m. There are two types of citizens: non-criminals (NC) and crimi-
nals (CR). Let the total mass of non-criminals be mNC and the total mass of
criminals be mCR. Each citizen has private information about her own type. At
the beginning of the game, all citizens interact in a public place where they can
observe the actions of others. After the observation in a public place, each citizen
obtains imperfect knowledge about the identity of a criminal. Each citizen then
has the opportunity to call the police with a crime tip. It is necessary to have two
types of citizens in this model because there needs be some uncertainty about
4the identity of the caller. If all citizens were of the criminal type, then the police
would believe that all callers were criminals.
Let μNC and μCR be the respective probabilities that a non-criminal’s tip and
a criminal’s tip lead to a conviction of a criminal. Assume that 0 ≤ μNC <
μCR ≤ 1. In other words, criminals have better information than non-criminals3.
The total number of non-criminal and criminal callers is determined endogenously
i nt h eg a m ea n di sn o t a t e da snNC and nCR respectively. Furthermore, assume
that μNCmNC + μCRmCR ≤ mCR; if every citizen calls, the number of criminal
convictions has to be less than or equal to the total mass of criminals.
Assume that both non-criminals and criminals derive strictly positive net
beneﬁts bNC and bCR from helping the police.4 This assumption states that all
citizens care about helping the police, but not necessarily by the same amount.
In order for anonymity as a policy to be socially beneﬁcial, it is necessary to
assume that individuals personally beneﬁt from revealing truthful information.
Otherwise, there is no incentive to call.
If a criminal is convicted of a crime, then she is punished and receives a utility
of −φ,w h e r eφ is randomly drawn from a continuous probability distribution
F(φ) with support [0,φ].
3While this assumption is reasonable, it is not necessary for obtaining the results. All that
is necessary is for μNC and μCR to be proper probabilities.
4While there may exist a cost associated with calling, this cost is already incorporated into
the parameters bNC and bCR,s i n c ebNC and bCR are net beneﬁts.
5There are two ways in which the police can use phone calls to identify crimi-
nals. The ﬁrst way is from citizens calling in tips, and the second way is from the
police tracing phone calls to obtain further convictions. The police do not incur
costs from receiving phone calls, but do incur a constant cost t from tracing a
phone call, where t ∈ [0,1). The probability of convicting a criminal based on a
traced call is ν. The police do not make mistakes in determining a citizens’ type.
In other words, non-criminals do not face a risk of being incorrectly convicted.
As the mechanism designers, the police can implement two possible systems:
one of anonymity and one of non-anonymity. Under anonymity, the police are
unable to trace calls back to their caller, while under non-anonymity, the police
a r ea b l et ot r a c ec a l l s .L e tnP b et h en u m b e ro fc a l l st h ep o l i c et r a c e .W h a t e v e r
system the police decide to implement, the citizens become fully informed about
what system is in place and also fully believe in it.
1.2.1 The System of Anonymity
Under the system of anonymity, all citizens will call the police with their crime
tips. Being unable to trace calls, the police rely entirely on the information
provided by the citizens to identify criminals.






0 if not call
Hence, all non-criminals call since bNC > 0.
nNC = mNC







mCR ) ∗ φ if call
−(
μNCnNC+μCRnCR
mCR ) ∗ φ if not call
Regardless of a criminal’s calling decision, she faces the possibility of being
punished from the information provided by other callers. Here,
μNCnNC+μCRnCR
mCR
is the probability of that occurrence.
All criminals call since bCR > 0.
nCR = mCR
Under the system of anonymity, the police are unable to trace calls, hence
nP =0 .
The expected utility of the police is
EUP = μNCmNC + μCRmCR
71.2.2 The System of Non-Anonymity
Under the system of non-anonymity, all non-criminals will call the police, but the
behavior of criminals will diﬀer depending on whether or not the police are able
to credibly commit to limiting the number of traced calls.






0 if not call
Again, all non-criminals call since bNC > 0.
nNC = mNC







nNC+nCR ∗ ν +
μNCnNC+μCRnCR
mCR ) ∗ φ if call
−(
μNCnNC+μCRnCR
mCR ) ∗ φ if not call
Regardless of a criminal’s calling decision, she faces the possibility of being
punished from the information provided by other callers. Here,
μNCnNC+μCRnCR
mCR
is the probability of that occurrence. In addition, if a criminal calls, her call may
be traced back to her with probability
nP
nNC+nCR. If the police traces the call back
to her, there is a probability ν of conviction.
Criminals call only when the expected utility from calling exceeds the expected

































Inequality (1.1) shows that the number of criminal callers n∗
CR depends on
whether the beneﬁt of calling bCR exceeds the risk of having the call traced.
If inequality (1.1) holds true with all non-criminals calling and the maximum































then only a portion of criminals call depending on the probability distribution












From this point on, the analysis diﬀers depending on whether or not the police
a r ea b l et oc o m m i tt ot r a c i n gac e r t a i nn u m b e ro fc a l l s .W h a tf o l l o w si sﬁrst, an
analysis with commitment, and second, an analysis without commitment.
1.2.2.1 With Commitment
In the commitment case, the police are able to credibly commit to tracing only
e nP calls. Since commitment is possible, the timing of the game is sequential.
The police ﬁrst announce that they will only trace e nP calls and then the citizens
make their calling decisions based on the announced value of e nP.T h e g a m e i s
solved using backwards induction. In deciding whether or not to call, the citizens
treat e nP as exogenous. As was determined earlier, all non-criminals will call
(nNC = mNC). Combining that information with equation (1.5),t h en u m b e ro f












The expected utility of the police is









νnP − tnP (1.7)
Knowing the best response of the criminals and how the choice of nP will
aﬀect n∗
CR, the police will select nP, so as to maximize their utility.
n
∗
P =a r gm a x
nP
EUP
Let the maximized expected utility of the police be denoted as VP.
It is possible for the police to select e nP > 0 suﬃciently small such that all
criminals will call. To achieve this the police must select e nP > 0 such that
condition (1.2) holds. In this case, equation (1.3) holds and thus n∗
CR = mCR.
The expected utility of the police becomes





νe nP − te nP (1.8)
The expected utility of the police given in (1.8) must be either equal to or
less than VP,s i n c eVP is the maximum expected utility of the police.
111.2.2.2 Without Commitment
After the citizens have already completed their phone calls to the police, the
police have no reason to trace only e nP calls because this is a one-shot game. In
this case, all citizens are aware that the police are unable to commit to tracing
only e nP calls. Since commitment is not possible, the timing of this game is
simultaneous.
Because non-criminals are unaﬀected by the police’s lack of commitment, all
non-criminals call (nNC = mNC).
The expected utility of the police is






In the case without commitment, the police will maximize their utility treating
nCR as exogenous. The number of calls that the police trace will be such that











Assume that the marginal cost of tracing a call is not too high. Even if all




















































The expected utility of the police becomes the following. Notice that because
the marginal beneﬁto ft r a c i n ge q u a l st h em a r g i n a lc o s t ,t h el a s tt w ot e r m so f
(1.7) becomes zero.
13EUP = μNCnNC + μCRnCR















Proposition 1 The expected utility of the police under non-anonymity with com-
mitment is greater than the expected utility of the police under anonymity.
If the police are able to commit to tracing only a very small number of calls,
then it is possible to still induce all criminals to call. Hence, under non-anonymity
with commitment, the police can induce all citizens to call in their crime tips.
In addition, the police are able to trace that very small number of calls, and
achieve an additional positive utility from tracing that very small number of
calls. Under the system of anonymity, the best that the police can achieve is to
induce all citizens to call in crime tips. Under anonymity, the police cannot trace
any calls and cannot achieve any more utility. Thus, the ﬁr s tb e s ts y s t e mi so n e
of non-anonymity with commitment.
Proof. The expected utility of the police under non-anonymity with commitment
14is at least as large as





νe nP − te nP
where e nP > 0 and condition (1.2) holds.
The expected utility of the police under anonymity is
EUP = μNCmNC + μCRmCR
















(ν − t)e nP > 0 (1.10)
Since mCR > 0, (ν − t) > 0,a n de nP > 0,i n e q u a l i t y(1.10) holds true.
Proposition 2 If the police have an incentive to trace calls, then the expected
utility of the police under anonymity is greater than the expected utility of the
police under non-anonymity without commitment.
Proof. The expected utility of the police under anonymity is
EUP = μNCmNC + μCRmCR
The expected utility of the police under non-anonymity without commitment
is




15Hence, this proposition states that








This inequality is the same condition for the police to have any incentive to
trace calls. In other words, as long as the police have an incentive to trace calls,
the police would have a higher utility implementing a system of anonymity.
1.4 Discussion
The stylized model presented in this paper highlights the beneﬁts of anonymity
in inducing truthful information revelation. In keeping with that focus, certain
assumptions were made. For instance, implementing a system of anonymity was
assumed to be costless. Once implemented, it was assumed that all citizens fully
believed it. Additionally, all citizens in the model, criminals and non-criminals
alike, cared about reducing crime. The ﬁrst part of this section addresses possible
concerns about those assumptions. The second part of this section then broadens
our understanding of anonymity by relating it to other commitment devices,
speciﬁcally, reputation and privacy.
161.4.1 Discussion of Assumptions
In the model, the cost of implementing a system of anonymity was ignored and
hence implicitly assumed to be zero. Relaxing this assumption changes the cost
and beneﬁt scale, but does not signiﬁcantly alter the essence of the model. Given
the existence of a commitment problem, the relevant comparison is between the
expected utility of the police under anonymity and the expected utility under
non-anonymity without commitment.
Recall that the expected utility of the police under anonymity was
EUP = μNCmNC + μCRmCR
while the expected utility of the police under non-anonymity without com-
mitment was




As long as the police actually have an incentive to trace calls (that is, mCR >
t
ν−tmNC), the police would be willing to pay up to the diﬀerence between the two
expected utilities in order to implement the system of anonymity (that value is,
mCR− t
ν−tmNC). If the police did not have an incentive to trace calls, then there
is no commitment problem.
Part of the implementation cost is making the system believable to the cit-
izens. Even if the police announce that they have a system that does not al-
17low them to trace calls, the public may not believe it. The believability of true
anonymity is absolutely crucial in its eﬀectiveness. Given the prevalence of Caller
ID technology, it might not be possible for the police to convince the public that
phoned tips are completely anonymous. If the burden of convincing the public
that a system is anonymous is put on the police, then the cost of implementing
a system of anonymity may be prohibitively high. Instead, citizens may take it
upon themselves to ensure anonymity. They may call from a pay phone or send
anonymous tips through the postal system.
In other examples, such as voting and teaching evaluations, it is reason-
ably easy to construct a believable system of anonymity. A common system
of anonymity is to have individuals ﬁll in bubbles on a form that is then shuﬄed
with all other forms. Using electronic devices for communication tends to be less
believable as an anonymous scheme than using paper.
1.4.2 Relationship to Reputation and Privacy
A useful way to understand anonymity is to compare and contrast it with reputa-
tion. The two can be regarded as similar because they both resolve commitment
problems. Reputation serves as a commitment device in the face of short-run
incentive problems. In the classic chain store example, establishing a reputa-
tion for being tough can deter potential entrants, despite the fact that it may
18be cheaper to accommodate each new entrant in the short-run. Similarly, in the
stylized model of this paper, the police could resolve its commitment problem by
establishing a reputation for always keeping its word. As long as the police care
enough about future payoﬀs, reputation eﬀectively becomes equivalent to non-
anonymity with commitment. Therefore, as long as reputation can adequately
serve as a commitment device, it yields a better outcome than anonymity.
Reputation depends on the long-run incentives being more attractive relative
to the short-run gains. Reputation may not suﬃce as a commitment device for
several reasons. First, it requires repeated game play. Often times a citizen’s
interaction with the police is infrequent. Moreover, given the vast number of
police jurisdictions, a citizen’s interaction with the same police force is even less
frequent. Second, it requires individuals to observe past behavior. Assessing
the police’s reputation may require costly investigation through public records
or through asking fellow citizens about their past experiences with the police.
Moreover, a citizen who recently moved into a neighborhood may not know of
the police’s reputation. Third, citizens may not know the exact preferences of
the police and may not be able to infer whether or not the long-run incentives of
t h ep o l i c ea r es u ﬃcient for them to keep their word. Fourth, the party interested
in maintaining a reputation may in fact be comprised of multiple people who
have incentive to individually deviate. For instance, the Police Department as a
whole may want to maintain a reputation for keeping its word, but an individual
19policeman with career concerns may deviate by secretly tracing more phone calls.
While reputation may yield an outcome superior to anonymity, sometimes repu-
tation cannot work for the reasons explored above and implementing a system of
anonymity overcomes these obstacles.
From a diﬀerent perspective, anonymity can also be regarded as the opposite
of reputation. In the previous paragraphs, we discussed the police’s reputational
concerns. By turning our attention to the citizen’s reputational concerns, we
can see how anonymity can be regarded as the opposite of reputation. Estab-
lishing reputation requires repeated game play with an observable history. By
stripping away identity, anonymity eﬀectively makes all citizens short-run players
with no history. Criminals do not want to reveal themselves to be of the criminal
type to the police and they also do not want a reputation of being a snitch to
other criminals. Without anonymity, their reputational concern prevents infor-
mation dissemination. However, with anonymity, there is no regard for future
consequences, thus, allowing private information to be revealed.
A nice feature of both reputation and anonymity is that they resolve com-
mitment problems without a contractual agreement. An alternative resolution
to the commitment problem is an enforceable privacy contract5.P r i v a c y a n d
anonymity are closely related; they both withhold information from others. For
5There are many names for this type of contractual agreement including privacy policy,
non-disclosure agreement, and conﬁdentiality agreement.
20instance, a doctor agrees to a legally binding contract to keep patient records
private. Since a patient without privacy may fear loss of employment, being de-
nied insurance, or social discrimination, this contract allows the patient to seek
counsel and treatment and commits the doctor to keep records safe from outside
interested parties.
If a contractual agreement is unsustainable or unenforceable, then anonymity
may help to resolve the commitment problem in place of the contract. One
obvious example of an unsustainable contractual agreement is any illegal trans-
action. Surely, all illegal drug transactions are made with an anonymous form
of payment — cash. Another example is when the punishment for breaking the
contract is an insuﬃcient deterrent. For instance, when a customer reveals her
credit card number to a merchant, all of its employees have access to that in-
formation. Disgruntled, dishonest, or disregardful workers can easily breach the
privacy contract. A customer can avoid all such risk by paying anonymously with
cash.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper argues that anonymity is useful as a policy because it may help to
resolve a commitment problem. The commitment problem lies with the mech-
anism designer, that is, the police of the stylized model. The police need the
21citizens’ information in order to solve crimes, but they may be unable to prevent
negative consequences from befalling the informant. In particular, they may be
unable to keep their own word in tracing only a small fraction of the phoned
crime tips. After the calls come in, the police could convict more criminals by
tracing more calls than previously promised. When such commitment problems
exist, anonymity helps by inducing information revelation.
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23CHAPTER 2
Is Media Bias Bad?
2.1 Introduction
A common sentiment is that society is better oﬀ with unbiased experts than
biased ones. Much of the economics literature, notably starting with Crawford
and Sobel (1982), conclude that the conﬂict of interests between experts and
decision makers leads to information loss. I explore this topic of biased experts
in the context of the media market with the media ﬁrms as potentially biased
experts and news consumers as decision makers.
The American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) has identiﬁed at least
three diﬀerent interpretations of bias in a public poll.
"not being open-minded and neutral about the facts" : 30%
"having an agenda, and shaping the news report to ﬁti t ":2 9 %
"favoritism to a particular social or political group" : 29%
The meaning of bias in this paper encompasses the latter two interpretations.
24Bias is the media ﬁrm’s preference for a particular side. For example, The New
York Times is accused of having a liberal bias, meaning that it has a left prefer-
ence, while F o xN e w sC h a n n e lis accused of having a conservative bias, meaning
that it has a right preference. Moreover, the strength of the sided preference can
vary, so that The New York Times m a yb em o r el e f tb i a s e dt h a nThe Los Angeles
Times.
In this paper, I argue that consumers are better oﬀ with a biased media ﬁrm
rather than an unbiased one. Using a simple communication game between a
potentially biased media ﬁrm and unbiased consumers, I explore the incentives
for information acquisition in the media market. When information is costly, bias
provides an additional incentive for a ﬁrm to acquire it in the ﬁrst place. I also
show that competition among ﬁrms improves the welfare of consumers, and those
improvements do not depend on a diversity of biases. In other words, having two
ﬁrms of opposite bias does not improve the welfare of consumers any more than
having two ﬁrms of the same bias.
The framework of my model is best illustrated by a simple story. A mass of
voters is about to vote on a policy. Of two proposed alternatives, one of them is
better than the other. No one knows for sure which is better, but voters want
to select the best one. Before the election, voters can read a news report about
the two proposed alternatives. Meanwhile, the media ﬁrm can hire reporters to
25investigate the alternatives and then publish a report. The ﬁrm then generates
revenue from advertisements. Additionally, the ﬁrm also cares about having the
best policy in eﬀect, but may be biased toward one of the alternatives.
Five key assumptions are made in this model.
1. Information is costly for the expert to acquire. A cursory observation of
reality conﬁrms such an assumption. Media ﬁrms incur costs in hiring jour-
nalists, photographers, and sending them to various parts of the world to
collect information. Many previous models of media bias1 and commu-
nication games2 assume information is costless and exogenously given to
the expert. An author who does endogenize costly information acquisition
is Austen-Smith (1993 & 1994); however, he neither examines the conse-
quences of bias nor of competition. Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) also
have costly information, and I discuss their paper in the related literature
section.
2. People read news reports because they are informative, but reading is costly
in terms of time and eﬀort. With numerous alternative uses for a person’s
time and attention, consuming news cannot be costless. If it were costless,
then people might as well consume an inﬁnite amount of news.
1Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006), Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), Baron (2006)
2Milgrom (1981), Crawford and Sobel (1982), Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Shin (1994),
Glazer and Rubinstein (2001), Krishna and Morgan (2001), Battaglini (2002), Glazer and
Rubinstein (2004), and Dziuda (2007)
263. Reports are not priced by the ﬁrm.3 In reality, news reported through the
radio, Internet, and television are almost never priced. The revenue of most
media ﬁrms is generated through advertisements, and not from directly sell-
ing its reports. Reﬂecting such a fact is the recent demise of TimesSelect,
a paid subscription program of The New York Times online. Exceptions to
the non-pricing of reports include the Wall Street Journal online and por-
tions of the Financial Times online, but there are recent speculations about
the Wall Street Journal removing its subscription fees upon its acquisition
by News Corporation.
4. All parameters are common knowledge. There is no uncertainty about the
ﬁrms’ bias level, the cost of information, and the eﬀort cost of reading.
Here, common knowledge is a simplifying assumption used to separate out
the acquisition incentives from the eﬀects of uncertainty.
5. The media ﬁrms can withhold acquired information in their reports, but
cannot lie.4 Firms are generally accused of creating biased by selectively
omitting certain facts rather than outright fabrication, since being caught
lying results in large penalties. One example is the infamous New York
Times reporter Jayson Blair, who plagiarized and created fraudulent re-
3Previous models of media bias, such as Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Baron (2006),
include a pricing strategy for the ﬁrm.
4Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Mullainathan and Shleifer (2006) and Dziuda (2007) make a
similar assumption, but Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) allow lying.
27ports. To minimize damage to the newspaper’s credibility, not only was
Jayson Blair forced to resign, but two top editors as well. In the long run,
am e d i aﬁrm that continuously deceives the public cannot survive in the
industry, for no one would waste time reading lies. Alternatively, this as-
sumption is justiﬁed if information is veriﬁable. The consumer may be able
to verify facts on his own or ask the ﬁrm for the source of information. It is
not necessary for every news consumer to be able to verify the information,
just so long as someone is able to verify the information and expose any
fabrications.
The main result of this paper is striking — consumers are better oﬀ with a
biased media ﬁrm than an unbiased one. Informative equilibria exist when the
ﬁrm’s cost of acquiring information is suﬃciently low and the consumers’ eﬀort
cost of reading is suﬃciently low. Reports are fully revealing in informative
equilibria and this is not inconsistent with reality, as the ASNE cites:
More than two-thirds of adults say their perception of bias in news-
papers does not represent a "major obstacle" to being able to trust
newspapers as a source of news - perhaps because they believe they’ve
built suﬃcient ﬁltering mechanisms to identify and neutralize it when
they think they see it.
Moreover, as the ﬁrm’s bias level increases, its willingness to pay for infor-
28mation also increases. Since a biased media ﬁrm would never withhold favorable
information, withheld information must be unfavorable. If a biased media ﬁrm
does not acquire information, then consumers would believe the ﬁrm acquired
unfavorable information and was simply not reporting it. The certainty of an
unfavorable outcome by not acquiring information provides the incentive for a
biased media ﬁrm to acquire it. Therefore, a more biased media ﬁrm has a higher
willingness to pay for information than a less biased one.
The second result is that competition, modeled as a duopoly, improves the
welfare of the consumers. Having two ﬁrms rather than one improves the welfare
of the consumers because it allows for the possibility of two informative reports.
The third and ﬁnal result is that having two asymmetrically biased ﬁrms
does not oﬀer any more welfare improvements in addition to what was already
present with two identical experts. In the informative equilibria, reports are fully
revealing. The decision of a ﬁrm to acquire information depends on whether its
competitor is acquiring information. The bias level is relevant only in determining
whether or not a competitor will acquire information. Other than that purpose,
a competitor’s bias level does not aﬀect a ﬁrm’s decision to acquire information.
Therefore, the welfare improvements from competition do not depend on whether
the experts are identically biased or asymmetrically biased.
292.1.1 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the communication game literature, which includes the
classic paper by Crawford and Sobel (1982). In their paper, when the preferences
of the expert and decision maker are not perfectly aligned, information loss oc-
curs due to the strategic incentives of the expert to distort her message to the
decision maker. Numerous subsequent papers have explored diﬀerent possible
ways of attaining full information despite the conﬂict of interests. For instance,
Milgrom and Roberts (1986) as well as Krishna and Morgan (2001) consider com-
petition among experts. Battaglini (2002) considers bias across many dimensions.
Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2007) consider transparency of the expert’s bias to
the decision maker. They all share the common assumption that information is
costless and the expert is exogenously informed. Indeed, given that the expert
is informed, there is an incentive to distort the information. However, my paper
addresses the question, will the expert acquire that information in the ﬁrst place.
When information is costly for the expert to acquire, the conclusions are diﬀerent
because the incentives of the expert have changed.
Topically, this paper also contributes to the literature on media bias. Three
notable models of media bias are Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006), Mullainathan and
Shleifer (2005), and Baron (2006). Because interpretations of media bias greatly
diﬀer, the models also greatly diﬀer. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) do not have
30any biased players in their model and interpret media bias as the presence of
information loss. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) model the news consumers as
the biased players. Baron (2006) assumes that journalists are biased. All of these
papers on media bias assume information is costless and exogenously given to the
ﬁrm. As a result, they all focus on the information loss created by a conﬂict of
interests. In contrast, my paper shows beneﬁts in having biased media ﬁrms.
The most closely related paper is Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), who include
costly information. Our conclusions are similar in that we both provide arguments
in favor of biased experts, however our approaches are diﬀerent. Dewatripont and
Tirole compare an unbiased expert with two oppositely biased experts. Their
argument in favor of biased experts depends on having two oppositely biased
experts, while my argument does not. In my model, the decision maker is better
oﬀ even in the case of a single biased expert. Furthermore, I show that having
two experts of opposite biases does not improve the welfare of the decision maker
any more than having two experts of the same bias.
2.2 Model Environment
The story of the media market told in the introduction is now formally modeled
as a communication game between a potentially biased expert (the media ﬁrm)
31and a decision maker (the news consumers5).
There is a binary state of the world, S ∈ {R,L},u n k n o w nt oa l lp l a y e r s .A l l
p l a y e r sh o l dc o m m o np r i o rb e l i e f sa b o u tt h es t a t e ,Pr(R)=θ and Pr(L)=1−θ.
T h ee x p e r tc a ne i t h e ra c q u i r ei n f o r m a t i o no rn o ta c q u i r eo n ep i e c eo fi n f o r m a t i o n
about the state. The cost of acquiring information c is strictly positive. If an
expert acquires information, then she gets an imperfect signal s ∈ {r,l}.T h e
accuracy of the signals is Pr(r|R)=πR and Pr(l|L)=πL. After receiving a
signal, the expert publishes a report b s ∈ {b 0,b r,b l}. In her report, the expert can
either reveal the true signal or withhold information, but not lie. For instance,
if the expert acquired information and received signal l,t h e nt h er e p o r tc a nb e
either b l or b 0,b u tn o tb r. If the expert did not acquire any information, then she
must report b 0. Simultaneous with the expert’s acquisition decision, the decision
maker decides whether or not to read the expert’s report. Because reading a
report takes time and eﬀort, let e denote the eﬀo r tc o s to fr e a d i n go n er e p o r t .
After reading the report, if any, the decision maker selects an action A ∈ {L,R}.
F i n a l l y ,t h eg a m ee n d s ,a n da l lp l a y e r sr e c e i v et h e i rr e s p e c t i v ep a y o ﬀs.
5The decision maker can be interpreted in two ways. He can represent a single consumer or
he can represent a mass of identical consumers.
322.2.1 Strategies
The expert’s strategy is comprised of two decisions: acquiring information (αE)
and reporting information (ρE). The expert decides on whether or not to acquire
information, αE,w h e r eαE is the probability of the expert acquiring information.
Also, the expert decides on what to report given the signal she received. If she
received signal r,t h e nρE(b r|r) is the probability of reporting b r,w h i l eρE(b 0|r)
is the probability of reporting b 0. If she received signal l,t h e nρE(b l|l) is the
probability of reporting b l,w h i l eρE(b 0|l) is the probability of reporting b 0.I ft h e
expert did not acquire a signal, then she has no reporting decision; the expert
must report b 0.
The decision maker’s strategy is also comprised of two decisions: what report
to read, if any, (ρDM) and what action to take (αDM). The decision maker’s
reading strategy ρDM is the probability of reading the expert’s report. Here, a
mixed strategy of ρDM =0 .5 means that with 50% probability the expert reads
and with 50% probability the expert does not read.
Lastly, the decision maker decides on an action strategy depending on the
report read, if any. Let αDM(R|b r) be the probability that the decision maker
takes action R after reading report b r from the expert. Let αDM(R|b l) be the
probability that the decision maker takes action R after reading report b l from
33the expert.6 Let αDM(R|b 0) be the probability that the decision maker takes
action R after reading report b 0 from the expert. If the decision maker does not
read any report, then αDM(R|0) denotes the probability that the decision maker
takes action R after not reading anything. Notice that b 0 represents no report
when the decision maker chooses to read a report while 0 represents the lack of
a report when the decision maker chooses not to read a report.
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Figure 2.1: Timing of the Game
2.2.2 Payoﬀs
The expert receives advertising revenue, Rev(ρDM), which depends on the proba-
bility of the decision maker reading the expert’s report. In particular, Rev(ρDM)
6Notice that αDM(R|b l)=1− αDM(L|b l).
34is a strictly increasing function in ρDM. If the decision maker does not read the
expert’s report, then Rev(0) = 0. If the decision maker does read the expert’s
report, then the expert receives the maximum amount of advertising revenue:
Rev(1). In addition to advertising revenue, the expert cares about the truth and
may be biased toward one action. In particular, the expert receives a payoﬀ of
1 if the decision maker’s action matches the true state. Additionally, the expert
receives a payoﬀ of b if the decision maker takes action R regardless of the state.
If b =0 , then the expert is unbiased and only cares about having the decision
maker correctly match the state. If b>0, then the expert is right-biased. If
b<0, then the expert is left-biased. Receiving a negative payoﬀ when action R
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In this section, I present and discuss three variations of the model: (i) monopoly
model, (ii) duopoly model with identical experts, (iii) duopoly model with asym-
metrically biased experts. The equilibrium concept is sequential equilibrium.
I focus on equilibria in pure acquisition and pure reading strategies, and later
discuss why the equilibria in mixed acquisition and mixed reading strategies are
uninteresting. There are only two kinds of equilibria in pure acquisition and pure
reading strategies: informative and uninformative.
Deﬁnition 1 An informative equilibrium in the monopoly game is one in which
the expert acquires information and the decision maker reads the report.
Deﬁnition 2 An uninformative equilibrium is one in which no information is
acquired and no report is read.
I make two innocuous parameter assumptions throughout the paper.
36Assume θ<1
2 without loss of generality, because the game is symmetric to
the prior beliefs.
Assume that a signal is informative, meaning that a signal is strong enough
to change a player’s beliefs about the true state. Without this assumption an








The pure acquisition strategies for the expert are to acquire information and
to not acquire. The pure reading strategies for the decision maker are to read
and to not read. If the expert does not acquire, then it is a best response for the
decision maker to not read. Conversely, if the decision maker does not read, it
is a best response for the expert to not acquire. Such behavior leads us to the
uninformative equilibrium.
Proposition 3 For all parameter values (c ∈ <+, e ∈ <+,a n dbi ∈ < for all
i =1 ,2,...n) and for any number of n experts, there exists an uninformative
equilibrium.
37In this equilibrium, the expected utilities are
EU
DM =1 − θ
EU
E
i = Rev(1) + (1 − θ)
Having presented the uninformative equilibrium, the rest of the paper focuses
on the informative ones.
2.3.1 Monopoly Model
Using a game with one biased expert, I show how it is possible for a decision
maker to be better oﬀ with a biased expert than an unbiased one. The strategy
that occurs last in the timing of the game is considered ﬁrst: the decision maker’s
action strategy. If the decision maker reads either b r or b l, the action decision is
simple. He selects R given report b r,a n dL given report b l. The more complicated
decision occurs when the decision maker reads report b 0.
When the decision maker reads a report of b 0,h ec a nh o l dt h r e ed i ﬀerent
beliefs about the expert’s actions: (i) the expert received an r signal and withheld
information, (ii) the expert received an l signal and withheld information, or (iii)
the expert didn’t acquire any information at all. Whatever reporting strategy
the expert selects, the decision maker’s beliefs about b 0 will be consistent with the
expert’s strategies in equilibrium. In informative equilibria, reports of b 0 represent
either an r signal or an l signal. Hence, deﬁne the following two types: Type R
38and Type L.
Type R: The decision maker’s action upon reading b 0 i st h es a m ea si fh er e a d
b r. The expert reports b l given a left signal and is indiﬀerent between reporting b r
and b 0 given a right signal.
Type L: The decision maker’s action upon reading b 0 i st h es a m ea si fh er e a d
b l. The expert reports b r given a right signal and is indiﬀerent between reporting
b l and b 0 given a left signal.
With the exception of the uninformative equilibrium, all equilibria of the
monopoly game is either Type R or Type L. If the expert acquires information,
then she will report informatively according to either Type R or Type L.7 She
will not adopt a mixed reporting strategy for both r and l signals. Why would
the expert bother acquiring costly information to begin with, if she is planning
on distorting the report so that it becomes useless to the decision maker? If she
doesn’t acquire information at all, she can still report b 0, which will yield the same
expected utility as if she did acquire information save the cost of information.
Propositions 4 and 5 formally state the two informative equilibria8.T h e
7To be clear, there exist equilibria in which the expert adopts a mixed acquisition strategy.
With probability αE the expert acquires information. When the expert acquires information,
she will report informatively according to either Type R or Type L.
8There exists multiple Type R informative equilibria and multiple Type L informative equi-
libria, but the multiplicity is irrelevant. To understand why the multiplicity is irrelevant,
consider just the Type R informative equilibrium. The multiplicity arises because the expert is
indiﬀerent between reporting r signals as b r and as b 0. For instance, in one Type R informative
39discussion of all the threshold values immediately follows.
Proposition 4 There exists a Type R informative equilibrium when the eﬀort
cost is suﬃciently low (e ≤ eM), the expert is not too right-biased (b<b MR), and
the cost is suﬃciently low (c ≤ cMR).
Proposition 5 There exists a Type L informative equilibrium when the eﬀort
cost is suﬃciently low (e ≤ eM), the expert is not too left-biased (b>b ML), and
the cost is suﬃciently low (c ≤ cML).
In any informative equilibria, the decision maker reads the expert’s report.
He reads only when the eﬀort cost is suﬃciently low (e ≤ eM).
e
M = θπR − (1 − θ)(1− πL)
| {z }
Pr(R,r)−Pr(L,r)
If the decision maker does not read, he will rely on his priors and select action
L. Reading a report is worthwhile when the information in the report leads to a
diﬀerent action in the decision maker. Thus, the eﬀort cost threshold is equal to
the probability of correctly choosing action R minus the probability of a mistake,
that is, [Pr(R,r) − Pr(L,r)].
In informative equilibria, the reporting strategy of the expert must be incen-
tive compatible with her bias level. If the expert’s bias level is suﬃciently low
equilibrium the expert always reports r signals as b 0, while in another Type R informative equi-
librium, the expert reports r signals as b 0 with 50% probability. The argument is the similar for
the Type L informative equilibrium.
40(bML <b<b MR), then reporting according to either Type is credible.
b
ML = −
θπR − (1 − θ)(1− πL)





(1 − θ)πL − θ(1 − πR)
(1 − θ)πL + θ(1 − πR)
| {z }
Pr(L|l)−Pr(R|l)
If the expert is too right-biased (b ≥ bMR), then a Type R equilibrium cannot
exist. Such an expert has an incentive to deviate by reporting an l signal as b 0,
because in a Type R equilibrium, the decision maker believesb 0 represents an r sig-
nal. For instance, knowing that Ann Coulter strongly supports the right, a news
consumer would never believe that her report of b 0 represents an r signal. A Type
R equilibrium cannot exist for Ann Coulter. To understand why, suppose news
consumers did believe that b 0 from Ann Coulter represented an r signal. Then
she would have an incentive to withhold all information, thus leading consumers
to vote right. Such behavior is sub-optimal for consumers.
Although the Type R equilibrium does not exist for an expert who is too
right-biased (b ≥ bMR), the Type L one does. Type L is incentive compatible
with such an expert. Here, the expert cannot gain by reporting an l signal as b 0,
because the decision maker will correctly believe that it represents an l signal. A
Type L equilibrium exists for Ann Coulter. News consumers believe that all the
facts Ann Coulter reports support the right, while all her omitted facts support
the left.
41Conversely, if the expert is too left-biased (b ≤ bML), then a Type L equilib-
rium does not exist and a Type R equilibrium does. The argument is similar to
above.
In informative equilibria, the expert acquires information, which she does
o n l yw h e nt h ec o s ti ss u ﬃciently low. To identify the cost threshold, compare
the expert’s expected utility of acquiring information to that when she does not.
For both Types of equilibria, the expert’s expected utility of acquiring infor-
mation is the same because full information is achieved. It consists of advertising
revenue, the cost of information, the payoﬀ when the decision maker’s action
matches the true state, and also the bias payoﬀ when the decision maker selects
action R.
EU
E = Rev(1) − c (2.1)
+[θπR +( 1− θ)πL]+b[θπR +( 1− θ)(1 − πL)]
If the expert does not acquire information, then her expected utility depends
on what the decision maker’s believes about b 0.I n T y p e R , t h e d e c i s i o n m a k e r
believes b 0 represents an r signal, while in Type L, he believes b 0 represents an l
signal.
Type R: EU
E = Rev(1) + θ + b (2.2)
Type L: EU
E = Rev(1) + (1 − θ) (2.3)
42Hence, the acquisition strategy depends on the Type. In Type R, the ex-
pert acquires information when c ≤ cMR, while in Type L, the expert acquires
information when c ≤ cML.
Type R: c
MR =[ ( 1− θ)πL − θ(1 − πR)]
| {z }
Pr(L,l)−Pr(R,l)




ML =[ θπR − (1 − θ)(1 − πL)]
| {z }
Pr(R,r)−Pr(L,r)
+ b[θπR +( 1− θ)(1 − πL)]
| {z }
Pr(r)
The two cost thresholds, cMR and cML, are typically not equal,9 because the
diﬀerent Types lead to diﬀerent outcomes when information is not acquired as
shown by (2.2) and (2.3).T h i s d i ﬀerence aﬀects the incentives for acquiring
information.
Proposition 6 In an informative equilibrium of the monopoly game, regardless
of type, the decision maker’s expected utility is
EU
DM =[ θπR +( 1− θ)πL] − e
and the expert’s expected utility is
EU
E = Rev(1) − c
+[θπR +( 1− θ)πL]+b[θπR +( 1− θ)(1 − πL)]
9Generally, if (1 − 2θ) >b ,t h e ncMR >c ML.I f(1 − 2θ) <b ,t h e ncMR <c ML. And lastly,
if (1 − 2θ)=b,t h e ncMR = cML.
43Since all informative equilibria are outcome equivalent, what matters is the
existence of at least one of the informative equilibria and not which one. Hence,
it is only the larger of the two cost thresholds that matters. To understand this
point, suppose 0 <c MR <c ML.10 If 0 <c≤ cMR,t h e nb o t hT y p e so fi n f o r m a t i v e
equilibria exist. However, if cMR <c≤ cML, then only the Type L informative
equilibrium exists. Thus, it is the larger of the two cost thresholds, cMR and cML,
that matters in determining the existence of at least one informative equilibrium.
Denote cM =m a x {cMR,c ML}. The main result is stated in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 As the bias level increases, whether it be right or left, cM increases.
Proof. There are two cases to discuss: when the expert is increasingly left-biased
and when the expert is increasingly left-biased.
When the bias level is increasingly left-biased (b becomes more negative), the
cost threshold cMR increases, while cML decreases until it hits the minimum of
zero. In this case, cM = cMR.H e n c e ,cM increases as the bias level is increasingly
left-biased.
When the bias level is increasingly right-bias (b b e c o m e sm o r ep o s i t i v e ) ,t h e
cost threshold cML increases, while cMR decreases until it hits the minimum of
zero. In this case, cM = cML. Hence, cM increases as the bias level is increasingly
10The order, 0 <c MR <c ML, holds true when (1 − 2θ) <b<b MR. There are many
possible orderings depending on the parameters, and I have taken this particular order just as
an example.
44right-biased.
The interpretation of Theorem 1 is that a more biased expert has a larger
willingness to pay for information than a less biased one. The driving force behind
this result is what happens when the expert does not acquire information. When
Ann Coulter does not acquire information, she must report b 0. Because the news
consumers are aware of her extreme right bias level, they believe that she in fact
acquired a left signal and chose not to report it. Thus, not acquiring information
results in the left action; this is the exact opposite of Ann Coulter’s preference.
If she does acquire information, there is a chance for her to receive a right signal.
Since she reports all right signals as b r, a right signal allows her to convince the
c o n s u m e r st ov o t er i g h t .I ti st h ec e r t a i n t yo ft h eu n f a v o r a b l eo u t c o m ew h e ns h e
does not acquire information that provides the incentive for her to acquire it.
In addition to the two informative equilibria, there also exist two equilibria
in mixed acquisition and mixed reading strategies: Type R and Type L. In both
types of mixed strategy equilibria, the decision maker is indiﬀerent between read-
ing and not and the expert is indiﬀerent between acquiring and not. Therefore,
the equilibrium expected utilities of both players are the same as that in the
uninformative equilibrium. For that reason, I do not pay much attention to these
mixed equilibria.
Proposition 7 There exist two equilibria in mixed acquisition and mixed reading
45strategies: one in Type R and one in Type L. In both of these equilibria, the
decision maker’s expected utility and the expert’s expected utility is the same as
that in the uninformative equilibrium.
Below, I summarize the equilibrium expected utilities of the decision maker,
since we are concerned with the welfare of news consumers. Figure 2 and Lemma
1 express the same information. One is graphical, while the other is verbal. They
summarize the region in which the informative equilibria exist. As the bias level
of an expert increases, that region increases.
Let Z(i) be the set of all the equilibrium expected utilities for the decision
maker in a game with one expert.
Let z0 =1−θ, the expected utility of the decision maker in an uninformative
equilibrium.
Let z1 =[ θπR +( 1− θ)πL] − e, the expected utility of the decision maker in
an informative equilibrium with one report.
Lemma 1 For any b ∈ <, there exists a cost threshold cM > 0 and an eﬀort
threshold eM > 0,s u c ht h a t( i )i fc<c M and e<e M,t h e nZ(i) = {z0,z 1},a n d
(ii) if either c ≥ cM or e ≥ eM,t h e nZ(i) = {z0}.
46Figure 2.2: Equilibrium EUDM in the monopoly model
2.3.2 Duopoly Model with Two Identical Experts
Using a duopoly model with two identical experts, I show that competition im-
proves the welfare of the decision maker. Competition allows for the possibility
of more information. In a duopoly model, two informative reports are possible,
whereas in the monopoly model, only one informative report was possible. The
decision maker is never worse oﬀ with two identical experts than with one expert.
Now that there are two experts, each expert has an acquisition strategy (αE
i )
and a reporting strategy (ρE
i ), where i =1 ,2. If both experts acquire information,
then the signals they receive are independent. The decision maker’s reading
strategy, ρDM =[ ρDM
1 ,ρ DM
2 ],i sn o wav e c t o r ,w h e r eρDM
i is the probability of
reading expert i’s report11 for all i =1 ,2. The decision maker’s action strategy
11If the decision maker reads both reports, then ρDM =[ ρDM
1 ,ρ DM
2 ]=[ 1 ,1].I ft h ed e c i s i o n
maker does not read any report, then ρDM =[ ρDM
1 ,ρ DM
2 ]=[ 0 ,0]. To be clear on the meaning
of a mixed strategy, consider the strategy ρDM =[ 0 .5,0.5].H e r e ,ρDM =[ 0 .5,0.5] means that
47now depends on two possible reports if he chooses to read them. Lastly, if the
decision maker reads both experts’ reports, the total eﬀort cost is 2e.
In the duopoly model, there are two kinds of informative equilibria: one in
which only one report is read and one in which two reports are read.
Deﬁnition 3 An informative equilibrium with one (two) report(s) is an equilib-
rium in which one (two) expert(s) acquires (acquire) information and the decision
maker reads that expert’s (both) reports.
The informative equilibria with one report in the duopoly game is very similar
to that in the monopoly game. In the duopoly game, all informative equilibria
w i t ho n er e p o r tr e q u i r e so n eo ft h et w oe x p e r t st ob ed o r m a n t( t h a ti s ,t on o t
acquire information and for the decision maker to not read that expert’s report).
With one of the two experts dormant, the remaining game between the non-
dormant expert and decision maker is the same as the game with one expert.
There are potentially four diﬀerent informative equilibria with one report, because
either expert could be the non-dormant one and there are two types of informative
equilibria (Type R and Type L).
The remainder of this section examines the informative equilibria with two
r e p o r t s . T h es t r a t e g yt h a to c c u r sl a s ti nt h et i m i n go ft h eg a m ei sc o n s i d e r e d
with 25% chance the decision maker reads both reports, with 50% chance the decision maker
reads one and not the other, and with 25% chance the decision maker reads neither. It does
not mean that the decision maker reads half of expert 1’s report and half of expert 2’s report.














,i ti sp o s s i b l ef o re i t h e rs t a t eR to be more likely or state L
to be more likely. Since, it is uninteresting to read through both cases when they
share so many similarities, I assume the ﬁrst possibility (Pr(R|r,l) > Pr(L|r,l))
for the main discussion and relegate the second possibility (Pr(L|r,l) > Pr(R|r,l))
to the footnotes.
Similar to the monopoly model, when the decision maker reads a report of b 0
from expert i,h ec a nh o l dt h r e ed i ﬀerent beliefs about the actions of expert i.
He could believe that expert i (i) received an r signal and withheld information,
(ii) received an l signal and withheld information, or (iii) didn’t acquire any
information at all. In any informative equilibrium, a report of b 0 from expert i
can mean either an r signal or an l signal.
The duopoly model is more complicated than the monopoly one, because each
expert can adopt diﬀerent reporting strategies. Thus, the decision maker can hold





can represent any one of the four possible sets of signals:
(r,r), (l,l), (r,l), (l,r). Hence, deﬁne the following 4 types: Type RR, Type LL,
Type RL, and Type LR.




is the same as if
49he read (b r,b r). Each expert reports b l given a left signal and is indiﬀerent between
reporting b r and b 0 given a right signal.









. Each expert reports b r given a right signal and is indiﬀerent
between reporting b l and b 0 given a left signal.









.T h eﬁrst expert reports b l given a left signal and is indiﬀerent
between reporting b r and b 0 g i v e nar i g h ts i g n a l .T h es e c o n de x p e r tr e p o r t sb r given
a right signal and is indiﬀerent between reporting b l and b 0 given a left signal.









.T h e ﬁrst expert reports b r given a right signal and is indiﬀerent
between reporting b l and b 0 given a left signal. The second expert reports b l given
a left signal and is indiﬀerent between reporting b r and b 0 given a right signal.
For the same reason as was mentioned in the monopoly model, all equilibria of
the duopoly game is of a deﬁned Type except for the uninformative equilibrium.
An expert will not adopt a mixed reporting strategy for both r and l signals.
I ﬁrst focus on only Type RR and Type LL. Propositions 8 and 9 formally
state those two types of informative equilibria with two reports. The Type RL
and Type LR informative equilibria with two reports will be discussed later.
50Proposition 8 There exists a Type RR informative equilibrium with two reports
when the eﬀort cost is suﬃciently low (e ≤ eD), the experts are not too right-
biased (b<b DR), and the cost is suﬃciently low (c ≤ cDR).
Proposition 9 There exists a Type LL informative equilibrium with two reports
when the eﬀort cost is suﬃciently low (e ≤ eD) ,t h ee x p e r ta r en o tt o ol e f t - b i a s e d
(b>b DL), and the cost is suﬃciently low (c ≤ cDL).
In informative equilibria with two reports, the eﬀort cost of reading must be
suﬃciently low12 (e ≤ eD).
e
D = θπR (1 − πR) − (1 − θ)πL(1 − πL)
The decision maker reads both experts’ reports rather than just one if the ad-
ditional information gained exceeds the eﬀort cost of reading. The threshold













12Under the assumption Pr(L|r,l) > Pr(R|r,l),t h ee ﬀort cost threshold is eD =
(1 − θ)πL (1 − πL) − θπR (1 − πR).
13Under the assumption Pr(L|r,l) > Pr(R|r,l), the expected utility from reading two infor-
mative reports is EUDM = θπ2
R +( 1− θ)
£
π2
L +2 πL(1 − πL)
¤
.
51with that from reading only one informative report.
EU
DM =[ θπR +( 1− θ)πL] − e
In informative equilibria with two reports, the reporting strategy of each ex-
pert must be incentive compatible with her bias level. If the expert’s bias level





L − θ(1 − πR)
2
(1 − θ)π2





θπR (1 − πR) − (1 − θ)πL (1 − πL)
θπR (1 − πR)+( 1− θ)πL(1 − πL)
¸
However, if the experts are too right-biased (b ≥ bDR), then the Type RR
equilibrium cannot exist. The argument is similar to that in the monopoly model.
Because the experts are so right-biased, they have an incentive to deviate and
report l signals as b 0. If there were two Ann Coulters, the Type RR equilibrium
cannot exist for them.
Although the Type RR equilibrium does not exist in this case, the Type LL
one does. Type LL is incentive compatible with experts who are too right-biased
(b ≥ bDR). Here, the experts cannot gain by reporting l signals as b 0, because the
decision maker will correctly believe that b 0 represents an l signal. The Type LL
equilibrium does exist for two Ann Coulters.
14Under the assumption Pr(L|r,l) > Pr(R|r,l), the bias thresholds are bDR =
(1−θ)πL(1−πL)−θπR(1−πR)





52Conversely, if the experts are too left-biased (b ≤ bDL), then a Type LL
equilibrium does not exist and a Type RR one does. The argument is similar to
above.
In informative equilibria with two reports, both experts must acquire infor-
mation, which they do only when the cost is suﬃciently low. To identify the
cost threshold, compare expert i’s expected utility of acquiring information to
that when she does not, assuming that expert j b e h a v e sa c c o r d i n gt oe q u i l i b r i u m
play. For all four Types of equilibria, expert i’s expected utility of acquiring
information is the same.15
EU
E



























If expert i does not acquire information, then her expected utility depends on
the Type.
Type RR : EU
E
i = Rev(1) + θ + b (2.5)
Type LL : EU
E
i = Rev(1) + [θπR + πL(1 − θ)] + b[(1 − θ)(1− πL)+θπR] (2.6)
In Type RR, the decision maker believes b 0 from expert i represents an r signal.
Because of the assumption Pr(R|r,l) > Pr(L|r,l),i nT y p eR Rt h eo n l yt i m et h e
15Under the assumption Pr(L|r,l) > Pr(R|r,l),e x p e r ti’s expected utility of ac-
quiring information is EUE
i = Rev(1) − c +
£
θπ2
R +( 1− θ)
¡







R +( 1− θ)(1− πL)
2
i




.I f e x p e r t i does





Therefore, if expert i does not acquire information, the decision maker will always
select R, regardless of expert j’s report.16
By comparing the expected utilities, (2.4) and (2.5),Id e t e r m i n et h eT y p eR R
cost threshold17. Below this threshold, expert i acquires information and above,


















In Type LL, the decision maker believes b 0 from expert i represents an l signal.
Under the assumption that Pr(R|r,l) > Pr(L|r,l), the decision maker selects R
given reports (b r,b l) and (b l,b r). Because in Type LL the decision maker believes









. Therefore, if expert i does not acquire information, then the
decision maker’s action decision is determined entirely by expert j’s informative
reports.18 In other words, expert i is able to free ride from the information
16Under the assumption Pr(L|r,l) > Pr(L|r,l),i fe x p e r ti does not acquire information, then
the decision maker’s action depends entirely on expert j’s informative reports. Because the










17Under the assumption Pr(L|rl) > Pr(R|rl),t h ec o s tt h r e s h o l di scDR =
[(1 − θ)πL (1 − πL) − θπR (1 − πR)] − b[(1 − θ)πL (1 − πL)+θπR (1 − πR)]
18Under the assumption Pr(L|r,l) > Pr(L|r,l),i fe x p e r ti does not acquire information, then
the decision maker’s always selects action L. The only time the decision maker selects action R
is after reading reports (b r,b r).I fe x p e r ti does not acquire information, then the decision maker
will never receive reports (b r,b r).
54acquired by expert j.
By comparing the expected utilities, (2.4) and (2.6),Id e t e r m i n et h eT y p eL L
cost threshold19. Below this threshold, expert i acquires information and above,






θπR (1 − πR) − (1 − θ)πL(1 − πL)




The incentives for information acquisition greatly diﬀer between the two
Types, because of what occurs when an expert does not acquire. In Type RR,
if an expert does not acquire information, the decision maker will choose R.I n
Type LL, an expert has an incentive to free ride oﬀ of the information provided
by the other expert.20
Having fully discussed the Type RR and Type LL informative equilibria with
two reports, I now examine equilibria in which the experts adopt asymmetric
reporting strategies. There exists a Type RL informative equilibrium with two
r e p o r t sw h e nt h ec o s to fi n f o r m a t i o ni sl o w e rt h a nt h em i n i m u mo fcDR and cDL.
I ft h ec o s tl i e sa b o v ecDR, then the ﬁrst expert will no longer acquire information
given that the second is acquiring information. Likewise, if the cost lies above
cDL, then the second expert will no longer acquire information given that ﬁrst is
19In the second case, where Pr(L|rl) > Pr(R|rl), the cost threshold is cDL = h





θπ2 +( 1− θ)(1− πL)
2
i
20In the second case, where Pr(L|rl) > Pr(R|rl), Type RR would provide the incentive to
free ride, while Type LL would provide the expert with complete power to convince the decision
maker to choose L.
55acquiring information. When the cost lies between cDR and cDL,o n eo ft h et w o
experts will no longer ﬁnd it in her best interests to acquire information. For the
same reason, the Type LR informative equilibrium with two reports exists when
the cost of information is lower than the minimum of cDR and cDL.
Proposition 10 There exist Type RL and Type LR informative equilibria with
two reports when the eﬀort cost is suﬃciently low (e ≤ eD) ,t h ee x p e r t sa r en o t
too left- nor too right-biased (bDL <b<b DR), and the cost is suﬃciently low
(c ≤ min{cDR,c DL}).
Equilibria with asymmetric reporting strategies are not particularly interest-
ing. Their existence requires c ≤ min{cDR,c DL}. When the two experts adopt
symmetric reporting strategies, an informative equilibrium with two reports ex-
ists when c ≤ max{cDR,c DL}. Therefore, whenever an informative equilibrium
with asymmetric reporting strategies exists, so does an informative equilibrium
with symmetric reporting strategies.
Since all informative equilibria with two reports are outcome equivalent, what
matters is the existence of at least one of those equilibria and not which one.
Hence, it is only the larger of the two cost thresholds that matters. Let cD =
max{cDR,c DL}.
Proposition 11 In any informative equilibrium with two reports, the decision















and the expected utility of each expert is
EU
E



























Equilibria with mixed acquisition strategies and mixed reading strategies do
exist in the duopoly model, but they are not particularly interesting. One set of
mixed strategy equilibria occur when the decision maker is indiﬀerent between
not reading and reading one report. This set of mixed strategy equilibria is out-
come equivalent to the uninformative equilibrium. Another set of mixed strategy
equilibria occur when the decision maker is indiﬀerent between reading one report
and reading two reports. This set of mixed strategy equilibria is outcome equiva-
lent to the informative equilibria with one report. The decision maker will never
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i = Rev(1) − c
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R +( 1− θ)(1− πL)
2
i
57be indiﬀerent between reading no report and two reports, because the marginal
cost of reading is constant, while the marginal beneﬁt of reading decreases. A
more formal discussion of the mixed strategy equilibria appears in the appendix.
C o m p e t i t i o ni m p r o v e sw e l f a r eb e c a u s em o r ei n f o r m a t i o nc a nb ea c q u i r e d .I n
the duopoly model, two signals can be acquired and reported, whereas, in the
monopoly model, only one signal was possible. Below, I summarize the set of
equilibrium expected utilities for the decision maker in the duopoly game.
Let Z(i,i) be the set of all the equilibrium expected utilities for the decision
maker in a game with two identical experts.
Recall that z0 =1 − θ, the expected utility of the decision maker in an
uninformative equilibrium.
Recall that z1 =[ θπR +( 1− θ)πL] − e, the expected utility of the decision
maker in an informative equilibrium with one reports.
Let z2 =[ θπ2
R +2 θπR(1 − πR)+( 1− θ)π2
L] − 2e, the expected utility of the
decision maker in an informative equilibrium with two reports.
The following two lemmas and two graphs express the set Z(i,i),t h a ti s ,t h e
set of all the equilibrium expected utilities for the decision maker in a game with
two identical experts.
Lemma 2 If e<e M and c<c M,t h e nz1 ∈ Z(i,i) and z1 ∈ Z(i).
58Figure 2.3: Equilibria EUDM when cM >c D
Lemma 3 If e ≤ eD and c ≤ cD,t h e nz2 ∈ Z(i,i).
Depending on the parameters, it is possible for either cM >c D or cD >c M.
Figure 3 depicts the case when cM >c D.
Figures 4 depicts the opposite case when cD >c M.
Informally speaking, the decision maker is better oﬀ i nt h eg a m ew i t ht w oe x -
perts than the game with only one expert in the following sense. In the monopoly
game, the ﬁgure consists of the shaded regions with z0 and z1, while in the duopoly
game, the ﬁgure consists of the shaded regions z0, z1,a n dz2.T h u s ,f o ra l lp a r a -
meters, the set Z(i,i) is never "worse" than the set Z(i), while for other parameters,
the set Z(i,i) is "better" than the set Z(i). Theorem 2 formally states how the
decision maker is better oﬀ i nt h eg a m ew i t ht w oe x p e r t st h a nt h eg a m ew i t h
only one expert.
59Figure 2.4: Equilibria EUDM when cD >c M
Theorem 2
For any c ∈ <
+, b ∈ <, e ∈ <





(i,i) such that z
D ≥ z
M
For some c ∈ <
+, b ∈ <, e ∈ <





(i,i) such that z
D >z
M
2.3.3 Duopoly Model with Two Asymmetrically Biased Experts
There is a notion that having two equally biased experts may not improve the
welfare of the population as much as having two oppositely biased experts. I
explore this notion using the game with two asymmetrically biased experts and
show that additional welfare improvements do not emerge.
Let one expert be more right-biased than another (bj <b i). There are three
60possible cases. (i) Both of them could be right-biased with expert i being more
right-biased (0 <b j <b i). (ii) Both of them could be left-biased with expert
j being more left-biased (bj <b i < 0). (iii) Lastly, the two experts could be
oppositely biased (bj < 0 <b i). It is not necessary to consider each case individ-
ually for the analysis. All that is necessary is bj <b i. Without loss of generality,
let the ﬁr s te x p e r tb ee x p e r ti, and the second be expert j.Iﬁrst examine the
informative equilibria with one report and then that with two reports.
For the informative equilibria with one report, the asymmetric bias levels do
not change the decision maker’s eﬀort condition. Similar to the previous games,
t h ed e c i s i o nm a k e rr e a d so n er e p o r tw h e ne ≤ eM.H o w e v e r ,t h ea s y m m e t r i cb i a s
levels do change the experts’ acquisition decisions. The diﬀerent bias levels leads
to diﬀerent cost thresholds.
c
MR
i =[ ( 1 − θ)πL − θ(1 − πR)] − bi [θ(1 − πR)+( 1− θ)πL]
c
MR
j =[ ( 1 − θ)πL − θ(1 − πR)] − bj [θ(1 − πR)+( 1− θ)πL]
c
ML
i =[ θπR − (1 − θ)(1 − πL)] + bi [θπR +( 1− θ)(1 − πL)]
c
ML
j =[ θπR − (1 − θ)(1 − πL)] + bj [θπR +( 1− θ)(1 − πL)]




j } =m a x {cMR
j ,c ML
i }.T h e m o r e l e f t -
biased expert (that is, expert j) has a higher cost threshold than expert i under
Type R, while the more right-biased expert (that is, expert i) has a higher cost
61t h r e s h o l dt h a ne x p e r tj under Type L.










Let Z(i,j) = the set of equilibrium EUDM in the duopoly game with asym-
metrically biased experts, bi >b j.
Lemma 4 summarizes when an informative equilibrium with one report exists.
Lemma 4 If e ≤ eM and c ≤ cMA,t h e nz1 ∈ Z(i,j).
Now consider informative equilibria with two reports. Again, the diﬀerent bias
levels do not change the decision maker’s eﬀort condition. The decision maker
reds two reports when e ≤ eD. However, the asymmetric bias levels do change












































θπR (1 − πR) − (1 − θ)πL (1 − πL)










θπR (1 − πR) − (1 − θ)πL(1 − πL)




The more left-biased expert (that is, expert j) has a higher cost threshold
than expert i under Type RR, while the more right-biased expert (that is, expert
i) has a higher cost threshold than expert j under Type LL.










Proposition 12 A Type RR informative equilibrium with two reports exists when
the eﬀort cost is suﬃciently low (e ≤ eD), the experts are not too too right-biased
(bi <b DR, bj <b DR), and the cost is suﬃciently low (c ≤ cDR
i ).
Proposition 13 A Type LL informative equilibrium with two reports exists when
the eﬀort cost is suﬃciently low (e ≤ eD), the experts are not too too left-biased
(bi >b DL, bj >b DL), and the cost is suﬃciently low (c ≤ cDL
j ).
Proposition 14 A Type RL informative equilibrium with two reports exists when
the eﬀort cost is suﬃciently low (e ≤ eD), the ﬁr s te x p e r ti sn o tt o or i g h t - b i a s e d
63(bi <b DR), the second is not too left-biased (bj >b DL), and the cost is suﬃciently
low (c ≤ min{cDR
i ,c DL
j }).
Proposition 15 A Type LR informative equilibrium with two reports exists when
the eﬀort cost is suﬃciently low (e ≤ eD), the ﬁr s te x p e r ti sn o tt o ol e f t - b i a s e d
(bi >b DL), the second is not too right-biased (bj <b DR), and the cost is suﬃ-
ciently low (c ≤ min{cDL
i ,c DR
j }).
The cost thresholds are constructed based on the assumption that the other
expert is acquiring information and reporting informatively. To understand what
is going on in this game, let’s momentarily restrict attention to Type RR. Given
that expert j is acquiring and reporting informatively, expert i will acquire infor-
mation when c ≤ cDR
i . Similarly, given that expert i is acquiring and reporting
information, expert j will acquire information when c ≤ cDR
j . However, since
cDR
j >c DR
i , the equilibrium with two informative reports only exists when the
cost of information is less than the smaller of the two thresholds (c ≤ cDR
i ).
When c ∈ (cDR
i ,c DR


























64Lemma 5 If e ≤ eD and c ≤ cDA,t h e nz2 ∈ Z(i,j).
Let Z(i,i) = the set of equilibrium EUDM in the duopoly game with identical
experts with bias level of bi.
Let Z(j,j) = the set of equilibrium EUDM in the duopoly game with identical
experts with bias level of bj.
The duopoly model with asymmetrically biased experts does not oﬀer any wel-
fare improvements in addition to what was already present in a duopoly model
with identical experts. For every equilibrium in the duopoly model with asym-
metrically biased experts, there exists a corresponding outcome equivalent game
with identically biased experts.
Theorem 3 For any ﬁxed set of parameters (c ∈ <+, e ∈ <+, bi ∈ <, bj ∈ <





For some parameters, (c ∈ <+, e ∈ <+, bi ∈ <, bj ∈ < with bj <b i)a n df o r
any zA ∈ Z(i,j), there exists z ∈
¡
Z(i,i) ∪ Z(j,j)¢
such that z>z A.
Proof. In the duopoly game with asymmetric experts, the highest duopoly cost




j }}) can be any one of four
values, and the highest monopoly cost threshold (that is, cMA =m a x {cMR
j ,c ML
i })
c a nb ea n yo n eo ft w ov a l u e s . I n i t i a l l y ,i ta p p e a r st h a tt h e r ea r ee i g h tc a s e st o
65consider. In fact, there are only four cases to consider, because some cases can
be considered together.
1. Case 1:S u p p o s ecDL
i <c DR




=m a x {cDR
i ,c DL
i }.
(a) Sub-case 1.1: cMA = cMR
j
In this case, having two expert j’s is better than having one expert i
and one expert j.
If e ≤ eM and c ≤ cMA,t h e nz1 ∈ Z(j,j) and z1 ∈ Z(i,j).
If e ≤ eM and c ≤ cDA,t h e ni nt h ei n t e r v a lc ∈ (cDA,c DR
j ], z2 ∈
Z(j,j) but z2 / ∈ Z(i,j). This means a higher equilibrium EUDM can be
achieved in the interval c ∈ (cDA,c DR
j ] in a game with two expert j’s
than in a game with one expert i and one expert j.
(b) Sub-case: 1.2: cMA = cML
i
In this case, having two expert i’ si st h es a m ea sh a v i n go n ee x p e r ti
and one expert j.
If e ≤ eM and c ≤ cMA,t h e nz1 ∈ Z(i,i) and z1 ∈ Z(i,j).
If e ≤ eM and c ≤ cDA,t h e nz2 ∈ Z(i,i) and z2 ∈ Z(i,j).
2. Case 2:S u p p o s ecDL
i >c DR




=m a x {cDL
j ,c DR
j }.
66(a) Sub-case 2.1: cMA = cMR
j
In this case, having two expert j’s is the same as having one expert i
and one expert j.
If e ≤ eM and c ≤ cMA,t h e nz1 ∈ Z(j,j) and z1 ∈ Z(i,j).
If e ≤ eM and c ≤ cDA,t h e nz2 ∈ Z(j,j) and z2 ∈ Z(i,j).
(b) Sub-case: 2.2: cMA = cML
i
In this case, having two expert i’s is better than having one expert i
and one expert j.
If e ≤ eM and c ≤ cMA,t h e nz1 ∈ Z(i,i) and z1 ∈ Z(i,j).
If e ≤ eM and c ≤ cDA,t h e ni nt h ei n t e r v a lc ∈ (cDA,c DL
i ], z2 ∈
Z(i,i) but z2 / ∈ Z(i,j). This means a higher equilibrium EUDM can be
achieved in the interval c ∈ (cDA,c DL
i ] in a game with two expert i’s
than in a game with one expert i and one expert j.
Aside from shifting some cost thresholds, having asymmetrically biased ex-
perts does not alter the model with identical duopolists by much. The basic
results remain the same. Since full information is already achieved in this model,
having asymmetrically biased experts does not yield any further welfare improve-
ments. In other words, there are no additional incentives for experts to acquire
information if they are of opposite bias levels or of the same bias level.
672.4 Conclusion
This paper shines a spotlight on an often neglected aspect of the media market:
information is costly. The assumption that it is both free and exogenous is
common in the economics community. Agents in numerous models receive signals;
some signals are public and some are private, but almost all fall freely from the
sky. While the assumption is reasonable in some applications, it is not in others.
In a model about the media market, it deﬁnitely is not.
Given that information is costly, bias provides an incentive for ﬁrms to acquire
information. With the model presented in this paper, I have shown that a more
biased ﬁrm has a larger willingness to pay for information than an unbiased ﬁrm.
The incentive for a more biased ﬁrm to acquire information arises from what oc-
curs when the ﬁrm does not acquire information. By not acquiring information,
the consumers believe the ﬁrm did acquire information and is merely withhold-
ing it. Thus, the unfavorable action occurs with certainty. It is the threat of
punishment rather than a reward that drives the result.
The results of this paper caution against policies and regulations that attempt
to eliminate or alter the biases of ﬁrms, because there is a beneﬁti nh a v i n g
biased ﬁrms. Instead, the social goal should focus on ensuring no information
loss, possibly through the following three suggestions.
1. Published reports may be one-sided, but cannot contain fabrications. Market
68forces alone appear to be suﬃcient in achieving this goal. While fabricated
news can emerge in the short-run, it cannot last in the long-run. Firms that
present fabricated information are severely punished with reduced credibil-
ity among its audience. No one would waste valuable time consuming lies.
Both ﬁrms as well as consumers can expose the lies. While competing ﬁrms
may have stronger incentives than consumers in exposing lies, the Internet
oﬀers such a low cost publication method for everyone that consumers often
expose lies. For instance, average bloggers were the ones who ﬁrst pointed
out that Reuters published a digitally manipulated photograph of smoke in
Beirut, Lebanon.
2. The bias level should be publicly known. With the model presented in this
paper, reports are fully revealing in the informative equilibria. The result
of fully informative reports depends on the structure of the game. In par-
ticular, fully informative reports may not be achievable with a richer signal
space even when bias levels are known. Recent work by Chakraborty and
Harbaugh (2007) explore the extent to which reports are informative when
the biases are publicly known. They conclude that while the transparency
of the expert’s bias level positively impacts communication, full revelation
is not generally attained.
3. Competition among asymmetrically biased ﬁrms may help. Since fully infor-
69mative reports were achievable in this paper, having asymmetrically biased
ﬁrms was not necessary for welfare improvements from competition. There
was no beneﬁt in having asymmetrically biased ﬁrms in terms of informa-
tion acquisition. However, if full information is not achievable, then perhaps
asymmetrically biased ﬁrms helps in reducing information loss. Milgrom
and Roberts (1986) suggest that having ﬁrms with opposing biases helps to
a c h i e v ef u l li n f o r m a t i o nw h e nt h ep o p u l a t i o ni su n a b l et om a k et h ec o r r e c t
inferences.
I conclude that media bias may not be bad. In fact, having biased media
ﬁr m sm a yb eg o o d ,s ol o n ga st h e i rb i a si sk n o w na n di n f o r m a t i o ni sn o tl o s t .
702.5 Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :
Let n be the number of experts. For all parameter values, c ∈ <+, e ∈ <+,
bi ∈ < for i =1 ,2,...n, there exists an equilibrium for all n experts to not acquire
any information (αE
i =0for all i =1 ,2,...n) and for the decision maker to not
read any reports (ρDM
i =0for all i =1 ,2,...n) . G i v e nt h a ta l le x p e r t sd on o t
acquire any information, the decision maker’s best response is to not read reports.
Conversely, given that the decision maker does not read any reports, each expert’s
best response is to not acquire information. Thus, the decision maker will select
an action based on his prior beliefs. If the common prior beliefs are θ<1
2,
then he will select L. The equilibrium expected utilities are EUDM =1− θ and
EUE = Rev(1) + (1 − θ).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n s4 ,5 ,a n d7
The game with one biased expert is solved backwards by identifying the best
responses of the expert and decision maker. The four strategies are analyzed
in the following order: (1) the decision maker’s action strategy, (2) the decision
maker’s reading strategy, (3) the expert’s reporting strategy, and (4) the expert’s
acquisition strategy.
71Step 1: The Decision Maker’s Action Strategy
There are four components to the decision maker’s action strategy: αDM(R|0),
αDM(R|b r), αDM(L|b l),a n dαDM(R|b 0).T h eﬁr s tt h r e ea r es i m p l e ,w h i l et h ef o u r t h
is more complicated. The ﬁrst, αDM(R|0), deals with the decision maker’s best
response given that he does not read a report. Since θ<1
2, αDM(R|0) = 0 (which
is the same as αDM(L|0) = 1). Next, from the assumption of informative signals,
the decision maker follows the advice of truthful reports, that is, αDM(R|b r)=1
and αDM(L|b l)=1 .T h el a s t ,αDM(R|b 0),i sm o r ec o m p l i c a t e d .
Suppose the decision maker has reached the information set where the decision
maker reads report b 0. When the decision maker reads a report of b 0,h ec a nh o l d
three diﬀerent beliefs about the expert’s actions. He could believe that the expert
(i) didn’t acquire any information at all, (ii) received an l signal and withheld
information, or (iii) received an r signal and withheld information.


































+( 1− θ)αEπLρE(b 0|l)















+ θαE(1 − πR)ρE(b 0|l)+θαEπRρE(b 0|r)
Pr(b 0)
72The decision maker’s best response is as follows:










DM(R|b 0) = 1
i










DM(R|b 0) = 1
i











DM(R|b 0) = 1
i
Step 2: The Expert’s Reporting Strategy
If the expert receives a signal, then she must have purchased a signal. Take
αE =1as given. The reporting strategy is analyzed in two steps. The ﬁrst
step identiﬁes the best reporting strategy given an r signal, while the second step
identiﬁed the best reporting strategy given an l signal.
Sub-Step 1: Suppose the expert receives an r signal. Compare her expected











































































































If ρDM =0 , then the expert will be indiﬀerent between reporting b r and b 0.









































If αDM(R|b 0) = 1, then the expert will be indiﬀerent between reporting b r and
74b 0 (ρE (b r|r) ∈ [0,1]).
If αDM(L|b 0) > 0, the above inequality reduces to
−[Pr(R|r) − Pr(L|r)] <b
Denote the bias threshold as bML = −[Pr(R|r) − Pr(L|r)].N o t i c et h a tbML is
a negative value. The expert will report r signals as b r if she is not too left-biased
(b>b ML) . H o w e v e r ,i fs h ei st o ol e f t - b i a s e d( b<b ML), then she will report
r signals as b 0.L a s t l y , i f b = bML, then the expert will be indiﬀerent between
reporting b r and reporting b 0.
Sub-step 2: Suppose the expert receives an l signal. Compare her expected





















































































































If ρDM =0 , then the expert will be indiﬀerent between reporting b l and b 0.



















0 > [Pr(R|l) − Pr(L|l)]α
DM(R|b 0) + α
DM(R|b 0)b
If αDM(R|b 0) = 0, then the expert is indiﬀerent between reporting b l and b 0.
Either reporting strategy will result in the decision maker selecting L.
If αDM(R|b 0) > 0, the above inequality reduces to
[Pr(L|l) − Pr(R|l)] >b
76Denote the bias threshold bMR =[ P r ( L|l) − Pr(R|l)].
Hence, if the expert is not too right-biased (b<b MR), the expert will report
l signals as b l. However, if the expert is too right-biased (b>b MR), then the
expert will report l signals as b 0.L a s t l y ,i fb = bMR, the expert will be indiﬀerent
between reporting b l and reporting b 0.
The best response is summarized below.
1. If 0 ≤ αDM(R|b 0) < 1 and ρDM > 0, then the expert’s reporting strategy
given an r signal depends on her bias level. The expert will report r signals
as b r if she is not too left-biased (b>b ML). If she is too left-biased (b<b ML),
then the expert reports b 0 given an r signal (ρE(b 0|r)=1 ). Lastly, if the
expert’s bias level is equal to the threshold value (b = bML), then the
expert is indiﬀerent between reporting b r and reporting b 0 given an l signal
(ρE(b r|r) ∈ [0,1]).
2. If αDM(R|b 0) = 1 and ρDM > 0, then the expert is indiﬀerent between
reporting b r and reporting b 0 given an r signal (ρE(b r|r) ∈ [0,1]).
3. If 0 <α DM(R|b 0) ≤ 1 and ρDM > 0, then the expert’s reporting strategy
for an l signal depends on her bias level. She reports b l given an l signal
(ρE(b l|l)=1 ) when she is not too right-biased (b<b MR). If she is too right-
biased (b>b MR), then the expert reports b 0 given an l signal (ρE(b 0|l)=1 ).
77Lastly, if the expert’s bias level is equal to the threshold value (b = bMR),
then the expert is indiﬀerent between reporting b l and reporting b 0 given an
l signal (ρE(b l|l) ∈ [0,1]).
4. If αDM(R|b 0) = 0 and ρDM > 0, then the expert is indiﬀerent between
reporting b l and reporting b 0 given an l signal (ρE(b l|l) ∈ [0,1]).
5. If ρDM =0 , then the expert will be indiﬀerent in reporting strategies
(ρE(b r|r) ∈ [0,1] and ρE(b l|l) ∈ [0,1]).
Step 3: The Decision Maker’s Reading Strategy
To identify the best reading response, compare the expected utility of the decision
maker when he does not read with that when he does read.
If the decision maker does not read a report, then he must select an action
based on his prior beliefs. Since the prior beliefs are θ<1

























i (b 0|r)αDM(R|b 0)
i
+θ(1 − πR)ρE





i (b 0|l)αDM(L|b 0)
i
+(1 − θ)(1 − πL)ρE
i (b 0|r)αDM(L|b 0)
⎤











With a monopolist expert, the decision maker must choose whether or not to
read the expert’s report. He will read the report when
EU
DM(ρ
DM =1 )>E U
DM(ρ
DM =0 )
The best response is summarized below.
1. In Type R, the best response is as follows.
Read when e<α
E [(1 − θ)πL − θ(1 − πR)] − (1 − 2θ)
Do not read when e>α
E [(1 − θ)πL − θ(1 − πR)] − (1 − 2θ)
Be indiﬀerent when e = α
E [(1 − θ)πL − θ(1 − πR)] − (1 − 2θ)
2. In Type L, the best response is as follows.
Read when e<α
E [θπR − (1 − θ)(1− πL)]
Do not read when e>α
E [θπR − (1 − θ)(1− πL)]
Be indiﬀerent when e = α
E [θπR − (1 − θ)(1− πL)]
79When αE =1 , the best response of the two Types converges to
Read when e<e
M
Do not read when e>e
M
Be indiﬀerent when e = e
M
where eM = θπR − (1 − θ)(1− πL).
Step 4: The Expert’s Acquisition Strategy
The acquisition strategy is analyzed in 3 steps.
1. Type R and b<b MR
2. Type L and b>b ML
3. All remaining cases.
Sub-step 1:T y p eRa n db<b MR.
80Compare the expected utility of the expert when she acquires information to












[θπR +( 1− θ)πL]


























































DM [[θπR +( 1− θ)πL]+[ θπR +( 1− θ)(1 − πL)]b] >ρ
DM [θ + b]
ρ






MR =[ ( 1− θ)πL − θ(1 − πR)] − b[θ(1 − πR)+( 1− θ)πL]
Sub-step 2:T y p eLa n db<b ML.
81Compare the expected utility of the expert when she acquires information to












[θπR +( 1− θ)πL]


























































DM [[θπR +( 1− θ)πL]+[ θπR +( 1− θ)(1 − πL)]b] >ρ
DM(1 − θ)
ρ




Sub-step 3: The remaining cases include: (i) Type R and b ≥ bMR, and (ii)
Type L and b ≤ bML.
In these remaining cases, the expert does not strictly prefer to report truth-
fully for at least one of the two signals.
82In these cases, the following two statements are true.























If the above two statements are true, then expert is better oﬀ not acquiring
information at all. If she doesn’t acquire information at all, she can still report b 0,
which will yield the same expected utility as if she did acquire information save
the cost of acquiring information.
The best response is summarized below.




Do not acquire if ρ
DMc
MR <c
Be indiﬀerent if ρ
DMc
MR = c




Do not acquire if ρ
DMc
ML <c
Be indiﬀerent if ρ
DMc
ML = c
3. If Type R and b ≥ bMR, then do not acquire information (αE =0 ).
834. If Type L and b ≤ bML, then do not acquire information (αE =0 ).
From the results of Sub-step 3, it is clear that the only informative equilibria
a r eo fT y p eRo rT y p eL .T h ee x p e r tw o u l dn o tb o t h e ra c q u i r i n gc o s t l yi n f o r m a -
t i o ni fs h ed i dn o ts t r i c t l yp r e f e rt or e p o r tt r u t h f u l l yf o ra tl e a s to n eo ft h et w o
signals.
Step 5: The equilibria in mixed acquisition and mixed reading strate-
gies
1. There exists a Type R equilibrium in which the expert adopts a mixed
acquisition strategy (αE =
e+(1−2θ)
[(1−θ)πL−θ(1−πR)]) and the decision maker adopts
a mixed reading strategy (ρDM = c
cMR)i ft h ee ﬀort cost is suﬃciently low
(e ≤ eM), the expert is not too right-biased (b<b MR), and the cost is
suﬃciently low (c ≤ cMR).
2. There exists a Type L equilibrium in which the expert adopts a mixed
acquisition strategy (αE = e
[θπR−(1−θ)(1−πL)]) and the decision maker adopts
a mixed reading strategy (ρDM = c
cML)i ft h ee ﬀort cost is suﬃciently low
(e ≤ eM), the expert is not too left-biased (b>b ML), the cost is suﬃciently
low (c ≤ cML).
3. In all of the equilibria with mixed acquisition and mixed reading strategies,
84the equilibrium expected utilities are
EU
DM =1 − θ
EU
E = Rev(1) + (1 − θ)
If the expert adopts a mixed acquisition strategy, then her expected utility
of acquiring is the same as if she did not. Similarly, if the decision maker
adopts a mixed reading strategy, then his expected utility of reading is the
same as if he did not. Therefore, the equilibrium expected utilities of these
mixed strategy equilibria is the same as the uninformative equilibrium.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 :
By deﬁnition of informative equilibria, the expert acquires information and the
decision maker reads the report. If the expert acquires information, then the
expert will report informatively (as shown in Step 4 of the Proof to Proposition
4, 5, and 7). The Type of equilibria is relevant only in determining what reporting
strategy the expert adopts and what beliefs the decision maker holds about b 0.
But the Type does not aﬀect the equilibria expected utilities.
EU
DM =[ θπR +( 1− θ)πL] − e
EU
E = Rev(1) − c +[ θπR +( 1− θ)πL]+b[θπR +( 1− θ)(1 − πL)]
85P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :
Step 1: There exists a cost threshold cM > 0,w h e r ecM =m a x {cMR,c ML}.I f
cMR > 0 and cML > 0, then there is no question about the existence of a cost
threshold cM > 0. The question remains: is it possible for cM =0 ?
It is possible for cMR =0if the expert’s bias level is too right-biased (that is,
b ≥ bMR). However, if b ≥ bMR,t h e ncML > 0.
It is possible for cML =0if the expert’s bias level is too left-biased (that is,
b ≤ bML). However, if b ≤ bML,t h e ncMR > 0.
Hence, it is not possible for cM =0 .
Step 2: By the assumption of informative signals eM > 0.
Step 3: By Proposition 4 and 5, if c<c M and e<e M,t h e nz1 ∈ Z(i).B y
Proposition 3, for all c>0 and e>0, z0 ∈ Z(i), Hence, if c<c M and e<e M,
then Z(i) = {z0,z 1}.
Step 4:B yP r o p o s i t i o n7 ,i fc = cM and e = eM,t h e nz0 ∈ Z(i).S u p p o s e
cM = cML. Furthermore, for all c>0 and e>0, z0 ∈ Z(i) by Proposition 3.
Hence, if either c ≥ cM or e ≥ eM,t h e nZ(i) = {z0}.
86P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8a n d9 :
The game with two identical experts is solved backwards. Step 1 identiﬁes the
best responses of the decision maker when he reads a report, except for reports
that involve b 0. Step 2 identiﬁes that all equilibria, except for the uninformative
one, is one of four possible Types. Step 3 identiﬁes the decision maker’s reading
strategy. Step 4 identiﬁes experts’ acquisition strategy in Type RR, while Step
5i d e n t i ﬁes the experts’ acquisition strategy in Type LL.
Step 1: Decision maker’s action strategy
With two experts the decision maker’s action strategy is a plan involving 16
possible reports: 32 possible reports if he reads two reports, 2(3) possible reports
if he reads one report, and 1 possibility if he doesn’t read a report.
Based on the assumption of informative signals, the following best responses
are obvious: αDM(R|b r,b r)=1 , αDM(L|b l,b l)=1 , αDM(R|b r,0) = 1, αDM(R|0,b r)=
1, αDM(L|b l,0) = 1, αDM(L|0,b l)=1 , αDM(L|0,0) = 1. Additionally, αDM(R|b r,b l)
and αDM(R|b l,b r) is also obvious, but they depend on the parameters. Under the
assumption Pr(R|r,l) > Pr(L|r,l), αDM(R|b r,b l)=αDM(R|b l,b r)=1 . Under the
assumption Pr(R|r,l) < Pr(L|r,l), αDM(R|b r,b l)=αDM(R|b l,b r)=0 .





























87Step 2: Type RR, Type LL, Type RL, and Type LR
With the exception of the uninformative equilibria, all equilibria is of a type. If
the expert acquires information with some positive probability, then the expert
will report informatively (as shown in Step 4 of the Proof to Proposition 4, 5, and
7). The bias levels of the experts must be incentive compatible with the Types.
For Type R to exist (that is, one expert is dormant), the bias level cannot be
too right (b<b MR).
For Type L to exist (that is, one expert is dormant), the bias level cannot be
too right (b<b ML).
For Type RR to exist (that is, neither expert is dormant), both experts cannot
be too right-biased (b<b DR).
F o rT y p eL Lt oe x i s t( t h a ti s ,n e i t h e re x p e r ti sd o r m a n t ) ,b o t he x p e r t sc a n n o t
be too left-biased (b>b DL).
For either Type RL or Type LR to exist (whether in pure or mixed acquisition
and reading strategies), both experts cannot be too right- nor too left-biased
(bDL <b<b DR).
88Step 3: Decision maker’s reading strategy
Find the decision maker’s best response by identifying his expected utility when
he does not read, when he reads one report, and when he reads two reports. Then
compare the expected utilities.





























1 (b 0|r)αDM(R|b 0,0)
i
+θ(1 − πR)ρE





1 (b 0|l)αDM(L|b 0,0)
i
+(1 − θ)(1 − πL)ρE
1 (b 0|r)αDM(L|b 0,0)
⎤






























2 (b 0|r)αDM(R|0,b 0)
i
+θ(1 − πR)ρE





2 (b 0|l)αDM(L|0,b 0)
i
+(1 − θ)(1 − πL)ρE
2 (b 0|r)αDM(L|0,b 0)
⎤
























































⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
+πR (1 − πR)
⎡




















































































⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
⎤

























































































































⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
⎤































































































⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
⎤





























































































⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
⎤





















































































The best response is summarized below.
For all types, the best response for reading only one expert’s report is the
same as the monopoly model. The diﬀerence here is that one expert is dormant,
that is, she does not acquire information and is not read.
Given that the decision maker is already reading expert 2’s report, the fol-
lowing is his best response.
Read both reports when e<α
E
1 [θπR (1 − πR) − (1 − θ)πL(1 − πL)]
Read only expert 2 when α
E
1 [θπR (1 − πR) − (1 − θ)πL (1 − πL)] <e<e
M
Be indiﬀerent when e = α
E
1 [θπR (1 − πR) − (1 − θ)πL(1 − πL)]
94When αE
1 =1 , then the best response is
Read both reports when e<e
D
Read only expert 2 when e
D <e<e
M
Be indiﬀerent when e = e
D
where eD = θπR (1 − πR) − (1 − θ)πL(1 − πL).
Step 4: Expert’s acquisition strategy under Type RR
To ﬁnd the expert’s best response, compare the expected utilities from acquiring
information and not acquiring information. Without loss of generality, consider
the acquisition strategy for only expert 1.




















































































⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
Pr(R|l)πR(1 + b)
+Pr(R|l)(1 − πR)(1 − ρE
























































































































⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
⎤



















































































































































































































⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣




⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
























⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
>c
In Type RR, assuming that expert 2 is acquiring and reporting informatively,































100In Type R, assuming that expert 2 is not acquiring information, the best



















(1 − θ)πL − θ(1 − πR)




Step 5: Expert’s acquisition strategy under Type LL
To ﬁnd the expert’s best response, compare the expected utilities from acquiring
information and not acquiring information. Without loss of generality, consider
the acquisition strategy for only expert 1.










































































⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
Pr(R|l)πRρE





















































































Pr(R|l)πR − Pr(L|l)(1− πL)




























































































⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
Pr(R)πRρE





















































































Pr(R)πR − Pr(L)(1− πL)








































































Pr(R&l)πR − Pr(L&l)(1− πL)





⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
⎤
















Pr(R)πR − Pr(L)(1− πL)











⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣








Pr(R&l)πR − Pr(L&l)(1− πL)














Pr(R)πR − Pr(L)(1− πL)















⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣





















⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
>c
105In Type LL, assuming that expert 2 is acquiring and reporting informatively,


















θπR (1 − πR) − (1 − θ)πL (1 − πL)























[θπR − (1 − θ)(1− πL)]




106Proof of Proposition 10:
The Type RL and Type LR informative equilibria with two reports is very similar
t ot h eT y p eR Ra n dT y p eL Lo n e s .T h ed i ﬀerence arises with the bias level and
the cost threshold. Step 1 examines the bias threshold. Steps 2 and 3 examine
the cost threshold.
Step 1: For either Type RL or Type LR to exist, it is necessary that their bias
levels are incentive compatible with their Types. For Type RL to exist, Expert
1 cannot be too right-biased (b<b DR)a n dE x p e r t2c a n n o tb et o ol e f t - b i a s e d
(b>b DL). Conversely, for Type LR to exist, Expert 1 cannot be too left-biased
(b>b DL)a n dE x p e r t2c a n n o tb et o or i g h t - b i a s e d( b<b DR). Since the experts
are identical, they cannot be too right- nor too left-biased (bDL <b<b DR).
Step 2: For the Type RL informative equilibrium with two reports, assuming




Do Not Acquire if c
DR <c




















Assuming that Expert 1 is acquiring and reporting informatively, the best
response for Expert 2 is
Acquire if c
DL >c
Do Not Acquire if c
DL <c







θπR (1 − πR) − (1 − θ)πL (1 − πL)




Therefore, a Type RL informative equilibrium with two reports exists when
the c ≤ min{cDR,c DL}. It is the minimum value that is relevant because in
between cDR and cDL, one expert will not be willing to acquire information.
Step 3: For the Type LR informative equilibrium with two reports, the
conditions are just the opposite of Step 2. A Type LR informative with two
reports equilibrium exists when the c ≤ min{cDR,c DL}.
108Proof of Proposition 11:
By deﬁnition of informative equilibria with two reports, both experts acquire
i n f o r m a t i o na n dt h ed e c i s i o nm a k e rr e a d sb o t hr e p o r t . I ft h ee x p e r ta c q u i r e s
information, then the expert will report informatively (as shown in Step 4 of
the Proof to Proposition 4, 5, and 7). The Type of equilibria is relevant only
in determining what reporting strategy the experts adopt and what beliefs the












































Equilibria in mixed acquisition and mixed reporting strategies
In the ﬁrst four equilibria, the decision maker is indiﬀerent between reading no
reports and reading one report.
In the last four equilibria, the decision maker is indiﬀerent between reading
one report and reading two reports.




eM ) and the decision maker adopts a mixed
reading strategy (ρDM
1 = c
cMR)i ft h ee ﬀo r tc o s ti ss u ﬃciently low (e ≤ eM),
expert 1 is not too right-biased (b1 <b MR), and the cost is suﬃciently low
(c ≤ cMR). Expert 2 does not acquire information (αE
2 =0 )a n di sn o tr e a d
by the decision maker (ρDM
2 =0 ).




eM ) and the decision maker adopts a mixed
reading strategy (ρDM
2 = c
cMR)i ft h ee ﬀo r tc o s ti ss u ﬃciently low (e ≤ eM),
expert 2 is not too right-biased (b2 <b MR), and the cost is suﬃciently low
(c ≤ cMR). Expert 1 does not acquire information (αE
1 =0 )a n di sn o tr e a d
by the decision maker (ρDM
1 =0 ).
3. There exists a Type L equilibrium in which expert 1 adopts a mixed acqui-
sition strategy (αE
1 = e
eM) and the decision maker adopts a mixed reading
strategy (ρDM
1 = c
cML)i ft h ee ﬀort cost is suﬃciently low (e ≤ eM), expert
1 is not too left-biased (b1 >b ML), the cost is suﬃciently low (c ≤ cML).
Expert 2 does not acquire information (αE
2 =0 )a n di sn o tr e a db yt h e
decision maker (ρDM
2 =0 ).
4. There exists a Type L equilibrium in which expert 2 adopts a mixed ac-
quisition strategy (αE
2 = e
[θπR−(1−θ)(1−πL)]) and the decision maker adopts
a mixed reading strategy (ρDM
2 = c
cML)i ft h ee ﬀort cost is suﬃciently low
110(e ≤ eM), expert 2 is not too left-biased (b2 >b ML), the cost is suﬃciently
low (c ≤ cML) .E x p e r t1d o e sn o ta c q u i r ei n f o r m a t i o n( αE
1 =0 )a n di sn o t
read by the decision maker (ρDM
1 =0 ).
5. There exists Type RR and Type RL equilibria in which expert 1 adopts
a mixed acquisition strategy (αE
1 = e
eD) and the decision maker adopts a
mixed reading strategy (ρDM
1 = c
cDR)i ft h ee ﬀo r tc o s ti ss u ﬃciently low
(e ≤ eD), expert 1 is not too right-biased (b1 <b DR), the cost is suﬃciently
low (c ≤ cDL). Expert 2 does acquire information (αE
2 =1 )a n di sr e a db y
the decision maker (ρDM
2 =1 ).
6. There exists Type RR and Type LR equilibria in which expert 2 adopts
a mixed acquisition strategy (αE
2 = e
eD) and the decision maker adopts a
mixed reading strategy (ρDM
2 = c
cDR)i ft h ee ﬀo r tc o s ti ss u ﬃciently low
(e ≤ eD), expert 2 is not right-biased (b2 <b DR), the cost is suﬃciently low
(c ≤ cDL). Expert 1 does acquire information (αE
1 =1 )a n di sr e a db yt h e
decision maker (ρDM
1 =1 ).
7. There exists Type LL and Type LR equilibria in which expert 1 adopts
a mixed acquisition strategy (αE
1 = e
eD) and the decision maker adopts a
mixed reading strategy (ρDM
1 = c
cDL)i ft h ee ﬀo r tc o s ti ss u ﬃciently low
(e ≤ eD), expert 1 is not too left-biased (b1 >b DL), the cost is suﬃciently
low (c ≤ cDL). Expert 2 does acquire information (αE
2 =1 )a n di sr e a db y
111the decision maker (ρDM
2 =1 ).
8. There exists Type LL and Type RL equilibria in which expert 2 adopts
a mixed acquisition strategy (αE
2 = e
eD) and the decision maker adopts a
mixed reading strategy (ρDM
2 = c
cDL)i ft h ee ﬀo r tc o s ti ss u ﬃciently low
(e ≤ eD), expert 2 is not too left-biased (b2 >b DL), the cost is suﬃciently
low (c ≤ cDL). Expert 1 does acquire information (αE
1 =1 )a n di sr e a db y
the decision maker (ρDM
1 =1 ).
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 :
The cost threshold cM can take on two values: cMR and cML.C o n s i d e r b o t h
cases.
Case 1:I fcM = cMR and e ≤ eM, there exist two possible Type R equilib-
ria with one informative report. In one Type R equilibrium, expert 1 acquires
information and is read by the decision maker, while expert 2 is dormant. In
the second Type R equilibrium, expert 2 acquires information and is read by the
decision maker, while expert 1 is dormant.
Case 2:I fcM = cML and e ≤ eM, there exist two possible Type L equilib-
ria with one informative report. In one Type L equilibrium, expert 1 acquires
information and is read by the decision maker, while expert 2 is dormant. In
the second Type L equilibrium, expert 2 acquires information and is read by the
112decision maker, while expert 1 is dormant.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :
T h ec o s tt h r e s h o l dcD can take on two values: cDR and cDL. Consider both cases.
Case 1:I fcD = cDR and e ≤ eD, then the equilibrium in which both experts
adopt the reporting strategy of Type RR exists by Proposition 8.
Case 2:I fcD = cDL and e ≤ eD, then the equilibrium in which both experts
adopt the reporting strategy of Type LL exists by Proposition 9.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 :
Step 1: By Proposition 3, for all the parameter values, z0 ∈ Z(i) and z0 ∈ Z(i,i).
Step 2: Given a set of parameters, cM of the game with one expert equals
cM o ft h eg a m ew i t ht w oe x p e r t s ,a n deM of the game with one expert equals eM
o ft h eg a m ew i t ht w oe x p e r t sb yL e m m a??.T h e r e f o r e ,f o rc<c M and e<e M,
z1 ∈ Z(i) and z1 ∈ Z(i,i).
Step 3: For some parameter values (that is, c ≤ cD and e<e D), there exists
an equilibrium expected utility for the decision maker in the duopoly game that
is strictly greater than the highest equilibrium expected utility for the decision
maker in the monopoly game. If c ≤ cD and e<e D,t h e nz2 / ∈ Z(i) and z2 ∈ Z(i,i).
The highest possible equilibrium expected utility for the decision maker in the
113monopoly game is z1 and z2 >z 1 when e<e D.
Proof of Proposition 12, 13, 14, and 15:
The informative equilibria of the duopoly model with asymmetrically biased ex-
perts is very similar to that of the duopoly model with identical experts. The
diﬀerence is the bias levels and the cost thresholds.
All of the bias levels for both experts must be incentive compatible with
the Types. Otherwise, the expert would have an incentive to deviate and that
equilibrium would no longer exist, as shown in Step 2 of the Proof of Propositions
4, 5, and 7.
1. For the Type RR informative equilibrium with two reports to exist, both
experts cannot be too right-biased (bi <b DR and bj <b DR).
2. For the Type LL informative equilibrium with two reports to exist, both
experts cannot be too left-biased (bi >b DL and bj >b DL).
3. For the Type RL informative equilibrium with two reports to exist, the
ﬁr s te x p e r tc a n n o tb et o or i g h t - b i a s e da n dt h es e c o n de x p e r tc a n n o tb et o o
left-biased (bi <b DR and bj >b DL).
4. For the Type LR informative equilibrium with two reports to exist, the
ﬁrst expert cannot be too left-biased and the second expert cannot be too
114left-biased (bi >b DL and bj <b DR).
For each Type, the informative equilibrium with two reports exists when the
cost of information is less than the smaller of the two thresholds.
1. Type RR. Given that expert j is acquiring and reporting informatively,
expert i will acquire information when c ≤ cDR
i . Similarly, given that expert
i is acquiring and reporting information, expert j will acquire information
when c ≤ cDR
j . It was established that cDR
j >c DR
i .W h e nc ∈ (cDR
i ,c DR
j ],
expert i no longer acquires information even though expert j would acquire.
The equilibrium with two informative reports only exists when the cost of
information is less than the smaller of the two thresholds (c ≤ cDR
i ).
2. Type LL. Given that expert j is acquiring and reporting informatively,
expert i will acquire information when c ≤ cDL
i . Similarly, given that expert
i is acquiring and reporting information, expert j will acquire information
when c ≤ cDL
j . It was established that cDL
i >c DL
j .W h e n c ∈ (cDL
j ,c DL
i ],
expert j no longer acquires information even though expert i would acquire.
The equilibrium with two informative reports only exists when the cost of
information is less than the smaller of the two thresholds (c ≤ cDL
j ).
3. Type RL. Given that expert j is acquiring and reporting informatively,
expert i will acquire information when c ≤ cDR
i . Similarly, given that expert
115i is acquiring and reporting information, expert j will acquire information
when c ≤ cDL
j . However, in this case, either cost threshold could be the
smaller one depending on the parameters. Therefore, the equilibrium with
two informative reports only exists when the cost of information is less than
the minimum of the two thresholds (c ≤ min{cDR
i ,c DL
j }).
4. Type LR. Given that expert j is acquiring and reporting informatively,
expert i will acquire information when c ≤ cDL
i . Similarly, given that expert
i is acquiring and reporting information, expert j will acquire information
when c ≤ cDR
j . However, in this case, either cost threshold could be the
smaller one depending on the parameters. Therefore, the equilibrium with
two informative reports only exists when the cost of information is less than
the minimum of the two thresholds (c ≤ min{cDL
i ,c DR
j }).
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 :
T h ec o s tt h r e s h o l dcMA can be either cMR
j or cML
i , depending on the parameters.
Consider both cases.
Case 1:S u p p o s ecMA = cMR
j .W h e ne ≤ eM and c ≤ cMR
j ,t h ef o l l o w i n gT y p e
R informative equilibrium with one report exists. Expert j acquires information,
and the decision maker reads Expert j’s report. Expert i is dormant, that is, she
does not acquire information and her report is not read by the decision maker.
116Case 2:S u p p o s ecMA = cML
i .W h e ne ≤ eM and c ≤ cML
i , the following Type
L informative equilibrium with one report exists. Expert i acquires information,
and the decision maker reads Expert i’s report. Expert j is dormant, that is, she
does not acquire information and her report is not read by the decision maker.
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 :
T h ec o s tt h r e s h o l dcDA can be either cDR
i or cDL
j , depending on the parameters.
Consider both cases.
Case 1: Suppose cDA = cDR
i . This is the Type RR equilibrium. Given that
expert j is acquiring information and reporting informatively, expert i acquires
information when c ≤ cDR
i .G i v e n t h a t e x p e r t i is acquiring information and
reporting informatively, expert j also acquires information when c ≤ cDR
j .I f
bj <b i,t h e ncDR
i <c DR
j .T h u si fc ≤ cDA and cDA = cDR
i , then certainly c ≤ cDR
j .
Case 2:S u p p o s ecDA = cDL
j . This is the Type LL equilibrium. Given that
expert j is acquiring information and reporting informatively, expert i acquires
information when c ≤ cDL
i . Given that expert i is acquiring information and
reporting informatively, expert j also acquires information when c ≤ cDL
j .I f
bj <b i,t h e ncDL
j <c DL
i .T h u si fc ≤ cDA and cDA = cDL
j , then certainly c ≤ cDR
i .
117References
[1] American Society of Newspaper Editors. 1999. "Examining our Credibility:
Perspectives of the Public and the Press." http://www.asne.org. (accessed Au-
gust 5, 2007).
[2] Arce, Rose and Shannon Troetel. 2004. "Top
New York Times editors quit." CNN. March 1.
http://www2.cnn.com/2003/US/Northeast/06/05/nytimes.resigns.
[3] Austen-Smith, David. 1993. "Information and Inﬂuence: Lobbying for Agen-
das and Votes." A m e r i c a nJ o u r n a lo fP o l i t i c a lS c i e n c e . 37(3): 799-833.
[4] –—. 1994. "Strategic Transmission of Costly Information." Econometrica.
62(4): 995-963.
[5] Battaglini, Marco. 2002. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap
Talk." Econometrica. 70(4): 1379-1401.
[6] Baron, David P. 2006. "Persistent Media Bias." Journal of Public Economics.
90(1-2): 1-36.
[7] BBC. 2006. "Reuters Drops Beirut Photographer." August 8.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5254838.stm.
[8] Cabrales, Antonio and Piero Gottardi. 2007. "Markets for Information: Of
Ineﬃcient Firewalls and Eﬃcient Monopolies." Working Paper.
[9] Chakraborty, Archishman and Rick Harbaugh. 2007. "Clearly Biased Ex-
perts." http://ssrn.com/abstract=889190.
[10] Crawford, Vincent P. and Joel Sobel. 1982. "Strategic Information Trans-
mission." Econometrica. 50(6): 1431-1451.
[11] Dewatripont, Mathias and Jean Tirole. 1999. "Advocates." Journal of Po-
litical Economy. 107(1): 1-39.
[12] Dziuda, Wioletta. 2007. "Strategic Argumentation." Ph. D. Dissertation.
Princeton University.
[13] Ellison, Sarah. 2007. "Murdoch’s Choice: Paid or Free for WSJ.com?" Wall
Street Journal. September 19.
[14] Gentzkow, Matthew and Jesse Shapiro. 2006. "Media Bias and Reputation."
The Journal of Political Economy. 114(2): 280-316.
118[15] Glazer, Jacob and Ariel Rubinstein. 2001. "Debates and Decisions: On a
Rationale of Argumentation Rules." Games and Economic Behavior. 36(2):
158-173.
[16] –—. 2004. "On Optimal Rules of Persuasion." Econometrica. 72(6): 1715—
1736.
[17] Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan. 2001. "A Model of Expertise." The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics. 116(2): 747-775.
[18] Kreps, David M. and Robert Wilson. 1982. "Sequential Equilibrium." Econo-
metrica. 50(4): 863-894.
[19] Milgrom, Paul. 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems
and Applications." Bell Journal of Economics. 12(2): 380-391.
[20] Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts. 1986. "Relying on the Information of In-
terested Parties." The RAND Journal of Economics. 17(1): 18-32.
[21] Mullainathan, Sendhil and Andrei Shleifer. 2006. "The Market for News."
American Economic Review. 95(4):1031-1053.
[22] Perez-Pena, Richard. 2007. "Times to End Charges on Web Site." The New
York Times. September 18.
[23] Shin, Hyun Song. "The Burden of Proof in a Game of Persuasion." Journal
of Economic Theory. 64(1): 253-264.
[24] Stromberg, David. 2004. "Mass Media Competition, Political Competition,
and Public Policy." Review of Economic Studies. 71(1): 265-284.
119CHAPTER 3
Competition and Truthful Reporting
3.1 Introduction
In this paper, I investigate whether increasing the number of media ﬁrms increases
truthful reporting. Answering this question has policy implications for the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) regulation on media ownership.
"...we [the FCC] continue to have a public interest responsibility,
distinct from our diversity and localism goals, to ensure that broad-
casting markets remain competitive so that all the beneﬁts of compe-
tition — including more innovation and improved service — are made
available to the public." — FCC 2003
The FCC asserts that the media industry is suﬃciently diﬀerent from other
industries to require special regulation. Of particular concern is the ability of
media ﬁrms to slant their news reports or even lie in order to inﬂuence public
opinion. It is often believed that promoting competition in media markets allows
120the public to uncover the truth.
The arguments supporting the notion, competition allows the public to un-
cover the truth, are based on two broad concepts. The ﬁrst concept claims that
each ﬁrm reports a part of the truth (or even a falsehood) and the consumers
m u s tc o l l e c ta l lo ft h ep a r t st of o r mt h ew h o l et r u t h( o ra tl e a s tm o r eo ft h e
truth). The second concept claims the mere presence of multiple ﬁrms increases
the incentives for each ﬁrm to be more truthful. It is important to distinguish
these two concepts especially when one is investigating the eﬀect of competition
in the media market.
Although the two concepts are largely intertwined, most of the discourse on
this topic has focused on the ﬁr s tc o n c e p tm o r et h a nt h es e c o n d . P r o p o n e n t s
supporting this line of thought require decision makers to consult with suﬃciently
opposed parties and piece together the truth by themselves1.
T h es e c o n dc o n c e p ta n dt h ef o c u so ft h i sp a p e ri st h a tt h em e r ep r e s e n c e
of multiple experts increases truthfully reporting for each expert. Milgrom and
Roberts (1986) follows this line of thought by concluding that all relevant infor-
mation will be revealed with the presence of more experts if at least one expert
prefers the information to be revealed. Even more in line with this second con-
1Austen-Smith (1993) examines this in the context of congressional hearings. Krishna and
Morgan (2001) conclude that full revelation of information may be induced by an extended
debate between two opposing parties with rebuttal. Glazer and Rubinstein (2001) investigate
the optimal design of debate rules. Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) argue the beneﬁts of having
two opposing advocates rather than one unbiased party investigate.
121cept is the model of competition in Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006). They present a
sequential model in which a lead ﬁrm reports ﬁrst and competing ﬁrms report sec-
ond. Here, the competing secondary ﬁrms serve as a feedback mechanism which
allows consumers to determine whether or not the lead ﬁrm reported truthfully.
In their model, as the number of competing secondary ﬁrms increase, the prob-
ability of learning the lead ﬁrm’s truthfulness also increases. Therefore, they
conclude that increasing the number of ﬁrms increases the truth-telling incen-
tives of the lead ﬁrm. However, their conclusion is not particularly surprising
given the fact that the experts in their model are completely unbiased.
I explore whether competition increases truthful reporting for biased experts
by modeling the media market as a repeated communication game (also known
as a sender-receiver game) between multiple experts (who represent the media
ﬁrms) and a single decision maker (who represents a mass of identical consumers).
The ﬁrms are perfectly informed, and the uninformed consumers must rely on
the ﬁrms’ published reports to make a decision, such as a vote2.
The consumers are unbiased in the sense that they only care about selecting
the best policy or candidate. However, the media ﬁrms have political motives,
that is, a preference for consumers to vote in favor of a particular political party.
Although media outlets in the United States claim to be unbiased, many are often
2By modeling the decision maker as one player, I am assuming that the mass of consumers
all agree on what is considered the better alternative.
122accused of having a political bias. Newspapers in the United Kingdom, however,
a r em u c hm o r ec a n d i da n da ﬃliate themselves openly with political parties.
In my model, ﬁrms seek a reputation for being honest. There are two potential
types of ﬁrms (honest and strategic) and the type is unknown to the consumers.
An honest ﬁrm is not a strategic player; she always reports the truth. A strategic
ﬁrm is biased and can report the truth or lie.
The eﬀect of reputation as an incentive for truthful reporting has been pre-
viously studied. Sobel (1985) explored the truthtelling incentives of an informed
monopolist with reputational concerns. Further work by Sette (2006) analyzed
duopolists with reputational concerns and concluded that the presence of a second
expert had ambiguous eﬀects on the incentives to report truthfully. Contributing
to this literature, I ask whether increasing the number of experts increases the
truth-telling incentives for a biased expert.
Given the availability of multiple news sources, I assume that consumers se-
lect one ﬁrm’s report to read in each period. With increased competition, an
individual ﬁrm has a very small chance of being selected; that is, her power to
inﬂuence public opinion is very small. Thus, it is not obvious that competition
among ﬁrms with reputational concerns leads to truthful reporting, because both
the cost and beneﬁt of truthful reporting depends on the probability of being
selected.
123The main result of this paper is that increasing the number of ﬁrms increases
truthful reporting. Within a certain parameter range, there exists a mixed strat-
egy equilibrium in which all strategic ﬁrms randomize between reporting truth-
fully and lying. In the complementary parameter range, all strategic ﬁrms lie.
Increased competition has two eﬀects. (i) In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the
probability that a strategic ﬁrm reports truthfully increases as the number of
ﬁrms increase. (ii) The parameter range for the existence of a mixed strategy
equilibrium increases as the number of ﬁrms increase. In particular, the amount
of patience necessary for existence decreases.
In order to intuitively understand the incentive for truthful reporting, consider
a strategic ﬁrm’s reporting decision given that all other strategic ﬁrms lie. With
many ﬁrms, the probability of being selected today is small. Thus, this ﬁrm may
report truthfully today in hopes of free riding oﬀ of a competitor’s lie and still
maintaining their reputation. Tomorrow, with all of the other strategic ﬁrms
revealed to be liars, this ﬁrm will have a higher probability of being selected,
thus, making it more worthwhile to lie at the later date.
Although competition does indeed increase the probability of truthful report-
ing, it is never equilibrium behavior for all strategic ﬁrms to report truthfully.
As the number of ﬁrms tends to inﬁnity, the probability of truthful reporting
converges to a value less than one. In other words, consumers never learn the
124entire truth even with increased competition.
3.2 The Model
Multiple experts (i =1 ,2,...n) play a repeated communication game with a
decision maker (DM). The stage game proceeds as follows. At the beginning of
each period, nature selects one of two possible states of the world, Ω ∈ {R,L}.
The two states are equally likely to occur; states do not persist over time. Next,
each expert receives a perfect, private signal ω ∈ {r,l} about the true state. In
other words, all experts are perfectly informed, while the decision maker remains
uninformed. After observing her private signal, each expert publishes a report
b ω ∈ {b r,b l}. The reports are made simultaneously in each period.3 The decision
maker selects one expert’s report to read. After reading a report, the decision
maker takes an action. Then payoﬀs are realized and the decision maker learns
the true state of that period.
The model presented in this paper analyzes a repeated game that lasts for
two periods, t =0 ,1. A two period game is the simplest model to demonstrate
intertemporal trade-oﬀs. It provides a suﬃcient framework to address whether
reputational concerns and competition can discipline a strategic expert into re-
3Indeed the question may be analyzed with sequential reporting, but that is not my focus
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true state. 
Figure 3.1: Timing of Game
porting the truth.
Each expert i decides on a sequence of reporting rules, {σi
0 (ω0),σi
1 (ω1)}.T h e
strategy in each period consists of two components, σi
t (ωt)={σi
r,t,σ i
l,t},w h e r e
σi
ω,t is the probability of expert i reporting truthfully in period t given signal ω.
There are two types of experts: honest (H)a n ds t r a t e g i c( S). Honest types
always report their signal truthfully, while strategic types are allowed to lie. An
expert’s type is private information. At the beginning of the game, the prior
probability that an expert is honest p0 ∈ (0,1).
Because the decision maker learns the true state at the conclusion of a period,
when a strategic expert lies, her type is revealed at the conclusion of that period.
Thus, with a repeated game, there can be at most two groups of experts: (i) ex-
perts who have been revealed to be of the strategic type and (ii) experts who have
not been revealed to be of the strategic type. The ﬁr s ti sn a m e dt h e" s t r a t e g i c
126for sure group" and the second is named the "potentially honest group". There
is nothing that an honest type can do to distinguish herself from the strategic
type. Only the strategic expert can reveal her type by reporting dishonestly.
Let ht denote the number of experts in the potentially honest group in period
t. When a strategic expert lies, her type is revealed at the conclusion of that
period. Therefore, in the next period, she will be excluded from the potentially
honest group. At t =0 , all experts belong to the potentially honest group.
h0 = n
If a strategic expert reports truthfully in t =0 , then she remains in the
potentially honest group in t =1 . However, if she lies in t =0 , then she is
excluded from the potentially honest group in t =1 .
h1 = h0 − s0
= n − s0
where s0 is the number of experts who decide to lie in t =0 .
Let pi
t denote the probability that expert i is honest; this represents an expert’s
reputation. Only in period t =0is the value pi
0 = p0 exogenously given. All
subsequent values of pi
t are updated according to Bayes’ Rule. Throughout the
127paper, I will slightly abuse this notation. When an expert has been revealed
to be strategic, her reputation drops to zero (pi
t =0 ). There is no need to
notate that case. Hence, I use pt to denotes the probability that an expert in the
potentially honest group is honest at time t. Furthermore, because all experts
in the potentially honest group have the same probability of being honest, the i
superscript is dropped from the notation.
At time t =1 , p1 is the probability that an expert in the potentially honest











if ω0 = l
To better understand the evolution of p1, consider the following example.
Suppose all strategic experts report r signals truthfully and lie about l signals in
every period. If ω0 = r, then there is nothing learned about the experts’ types
and p1 = p0.I fω0 = l, then everything is learned about experts’ types. If honest
types exist, then p1 =1 . If all experts happen to be strategic, then p1 =0 .
While a strategic expert i knows her own type, she does not know her com-




































is an expert’s expectation about the number of other experts
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if ω0 = l
Because the decision maker selects only one expert’s report to read, his action





e l,t},w h e r eαi
e ω,t is the probability of following expert i’s recommendation.
That is, αi
e r,t =P r ( At = R, b ω
i
t = b r) and αi
e l,t =P r ( At = L, b ω
i
t = b l). Although the
decision maker only selects one expert’s report to read in each period, assume that
all expert’s reputations get Bayesian updated at the conclusion of each period.
Without loss of generality, assume αi
e r,t + αi
e l,t ≥ 1.W h e nαi
e r,t + αi
e l,t < 1,t h e
meaning of recommendations merely become switched4.
The per-period utility of each strategic expert is:
4To see this point, consider the fact that there are two ways to represent the decision maker
completely following the expert’s report: (αi
e r,t = αi
e l,t =1 )a n d( αi
e r,t = αi
e l,t =0 ). The ﬁrst
representation (αi
e r,t = αi
e l,t =1 )s a y st h a tg i v e nr e p o r tb r, the decision maker selects R,a n d
given report b l, the decision maker selects L. The second representation (αi
e r,t = αi
e l,t =0 )s a y s
given report b r, the decision maker selects L, and given report b l, the decision maker selects R.
Thus, the meaning of the report b r and b l are merely switched, but the expert’s inﬂuence over







action R b 1+b
For the rest of the paper, assume that strategic experts are strongly right-
biased, that is, b>1. The analysis would be the same as restricting attention to
strategic experts who are all left-biased (b<−1). Lastly, the case when strategic
experts are relatively unbiased (−1 ≤ b ≤ 1) is uninteresting, because they have
no incentive to lie in the ﬁrst place.
In each period, the decision maker wants to select the action that matches








All players maximize the discounted sum of single period payoﬀs. Let the
common discount factor be δ.
1303.3 Equilibrium Analysis
In the discussion of the main results, it is necessary to ﬁrst present some pre-
liminary analysis. First lemma (6) characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the
decision maker. Then I discuss the behavior in the last period subgame in order
to ﬁgure out the continuation payoﬀs. After this preliminary analysis, I then
present the main results, which focus on the equilibrium behavior in the ﬁrst pe-
riod of the game. Additionally, I restrict attention to equilibria in which strategic
experts adopt symmetric strategies.
Since the decision maker only selects one expert’s report to read in each
p e r i o d ,h ei sa l w a y sb e t t e ro ﬀ selecting an expert with some probability of being
honest rather than an expert that has been revealed to be strategic for sure.
Lemma 6 In each time period, the decision maker selects an expert from the
potentially honest group and follows the advice of that expert (αe r,t = αe l,t =1for
t =0 ,1).
In t =0 ,a l le x p e r t sf a c et h es a m e1
n probability of being selected. As n
increases, the probability of being selected decreases. In other words, as the
number of experts increase, an individual expert’s inﬂuence on the decision maker
decreases.
If no experts lie (s0 =0 ), then an individual expert’s inﬂuence over the
131decision maker remains the same over time. On the other hand, if some experts
lie (s0 > 0), then an expert who remains in the potentially honest group has a
greater inﬂuence over the decision maker in t =1compared to in t =0 .
Because the game is solved backwards, ﬁrst consider the last period of the
game, t =1 . In the last period there are two subgames to consider: (i) the
expert was truthful in the past and remains in the pool of potentially honest
experts and (ii) the expert was dishonest in the past and belongs to the strategic
for sure group.
Lemma 7 In the last period subgame in which the expert belongs to the poten-
tially honest group, the equilibrium behavior in pure strategies is all strategic
experts report r truthfully (σr,1 =1 ) and lie about l signals (σl,1 =0 ).
In the last period subgame in which the expert remains in the pool of po-
tentially honest experts, she has a 1
h1 chance of being selected and inﬂuencing
the decision maker. She has a complementary probability (1 − 1
h1)o fn o tb e i n g








be the expected utility of expert i in t =1when the decision






















































j is a deceitful, strategic expert
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦


































p1 (b − 1)
The expected utility of strategic expert i, who has always reported truthfully






























DM selects an expert who is not i







= b + 1
2 − 1
2p1 (b − 1), the expert’s expected utility




























































p1 (b − 1)
¸
(3.1)
Now consider the other subgame, in which the expert lied in the past and
belongs to the strategic for sure group. Since she belongs to the strategic for sure
group, the decision maker never consults her. Therefore, her reporting strategy
has no aﬀect on her payoﬀ.
Lemma 8 In the last period subgame, in which the expert belongs to strategic
for sure group, the equilibrium behavior of strategic experts is being indiﬀerent in
their reporting strategy (σr,1 ∈ [0,1], σl,1 ∈ [0,1]).
If the expert belongs to the strategic for sure group, then she has no control












The expected utilities in (3.1) and (3.2) are the continuation payoﬀs. Clearly,
the beneﬁt of truthful reporting in the ﬁrst period is being able to inﬂuence the
decision maker in the last period.
134Now that the preliminary analysis has been discussed, we can turn our at-
tention to the ﬁrst period problem, t =0 . Because the strategic expert is right-
biased, it is not surprising that she reports r signals truthfully in the ﬁrst period.
Lemma 9 A strategic expert always reports r truthfully in the ﬁrst period (σi
r,0 =
1 for all for all i =1 ,2,...n).
The more interesting case is when a strategic expert receives an l signal,
because she may have an incentive to lie. If she lies in the ﬁrst period, then
she gains today at the expense of forever being unable to inﬂuence the decision









be the expected utility of expert i in t =0when the


















































⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
Here, I present ﬁrst, the expected payoﬀs of reporting truthfully and second,
the expected payoﬀs of reporting dishonestly. Given ω0 = l,i fe x p e r ti reports
truthfully today (σi






















































p1 (b − 1)
¸¸
| {z }
Next period’s payoﬀ if expert i remains in potentially honest group


















































p1 (b − 1)
¸¸
Given ω0 = l, if the expert reports dishonestly today (σi















































Next period’s payoﬀsi fe x p e r ti is excluded from the potentially honest group










































The main result is presented below in proposition (16). Given that experts
are suﬃciently patient, a mixed strategy equilibrium exists in which all strategic
experts randomize between reporting truthfully and lying.
Deﬁne
δ
∗ =2 p0 +
2(1− p0)
n
137Proposition 16 If δ ≥ δ
∗, then there exists an equilibrium in which all strategic




2n − 1 −
p
2p0δn(n − 1) + 1
2(n − 1)(1 − p0)
and report r signals truthfully (σi
r,0 =1 )i nt =0 .T h e n ,i nt =1 ,a l ls t r a t e g i c
experts lie about l signals (σi
l,1 =0 ), report r signals truthfully (σi
r,1 =1 ), and the
decision maker follows the expert’s recommendation (αi
e l,0 = αi
e r,0 = αi
e l,1 = αi
e r,1 =1
for all i =1 ,2,...n).
Increasing the number of experts, increases the probability of truthful report-
ing, as stated below in corollary (4). While competition does indeed improve
truthful reporting, corollary (5) reveals that the beneﬁt of competition is limited.
As an illustration of Proposition (16), consider the following example in which
p0 = 1
4 and δ =1 .
σl,0 =1+
























p→0σl,0 =0 ,a n dlim
p→1σl,0 =1 .










Figure 3.2: Relationship between σl,0 and n when p0 = 1
4





























1 − 2n +
p
2p0δn(n − 1) + 1
2(n − 1)(1 − p0)
!
| {z }
Ω=L,E x p e r ti = S
⎤












































When experts are not suﬃciently patient, then they all lie in the ﬁrst period.
The proof of proposition (17) is presented below in order to demonstrate the
derivation of δ
∗.
Proposition 17 If δ ≤ δ
∗, then there exists an equilibrium in pure strategies in
which all strategic experts lie about l signals in both periods (σi
l,0 = σi
l,1 =0for
all i =1 ,2,...n), report r signals truthfully (σi
r,0 = σi
r,1 =1for all i =1 ,2,...n),
and the decision maker follows the expert’s recommendation (αi
e l,0 = αi
e r,0 = αi
e l,1 =
αi
e r,1 =1for all i =1 ,2,...n).
















































































































e l,0 + α
i














e l,0 + α
i








e l,0 + α
i
e r,0 − 1
´
(np0 +1− p0)
From Lemma (??), αi
e l,0 = αi









∗, all strategic experts strictly prefer to lie. When δ = δ
∗,t h e y
are indiﬀerent between lying and not.
As an illustration of Proposition (17), consider the case when p0 = 1
4.










Figure 3.3: Relationship between δ





















Below the curve represents the area where the only equilibrium in pure strate-
gies is for all strategic experts to lie. Above the curve represents the area where
the mixed strategy equilibrium exists.




n2 < 0). The
interpretation is that as the number of experts increase, the amount of patience
142necessary for some truthful reporting decreases.
Corollary 6 lim
n→∞δ






Proposition 18 It is never equilibrium behavior for all strategic experts to report
an l signal truthfully in the ﬁrst period.
When experts are suﬃciently patient, truthful reporting does emerge from
strategic experts. In particular, they randomize between truthful reporting and
lying. However, when experts are not suﬃciently patient, then all strategic ex-
perts lie. Increasing the number of experts has two eﬀects. It increases the
probability of truthful reporting in the mixed strategy equilibrium and it also
decreases δ
∗, so that the mixed strategy equilibrium exists for a larger range of
parameters.
Lastly, while it is true that increasing the number of experts does increase
truthful reporting, the eﬀect of competition in providing such incentives is limited.
In this model, the beneﬁts of competition in terms of truthful reporting reaches a
limit, which is less than one. The decision maker does not learn the entire truth
no matter how many experts are added to the game.
1433.4 Conclusion
The results of this paper conﬁrm the conventional wisdom that competition in-
creases truthful reporting. While there does not exist an equilibrium in which
all biased media ﬁrms report truthfully, there does exist an incentive for some
biased ﬁrms to report truthfully under certain parameters. Moreover, increasing
the number of ﬁrms does indeed increase this incentive.
However, it is important to note that the beneﬁts of competition in promoting
truth-telling among biased media ﬁrms are limited. That is, as the number of
ﬁrms tends toward inﬁnity, the probability of truthful reporting from biased media
ﬁrms reaches a limit that is less than one. No matter how many competing ﬁrms
one adds to the market, it is not possible to achieve completely truthful reporting
from all biased ﬁrms.
T h ep o l i c yi m p l i c a t i o n so ft h i sp a p e rs u p p o r tt h eF C C ’ sc u r r e n ts t a n c eo n
media ownership regulation. In recent years, the FCC has reduced some of their
restrictions on media ownership, allowing for the formation of larger media con-
glomerates. Their trend towards deregulation has generated many critics, such
as Senator Bryon L. Dorgan.
"We really do literally have ﬁve or six major corporations in this coun-
try that determine for the most part what Americans see, hear and
read every day," said Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.), the lead spon-
144sor of the resolution. "I don’t think that’s healthy for our country."
While this paper does not specify an optimal number of media ﬁrms, that is,
it doesn’t say whether ﬁve or six media ﬁrms is good or bad, it does demonstrate
that competition is limited in its ability to induce biased ﬁrms to be more truthful.
Therefore, it is not always worthwhile to restrict ownership in order to artiﬁcially
increase the number of media ﬁrms, at least not from the perspective of achieving
more truthful reporting. I do not deny other possible beneﬁts of competition,
such as diversity of information. I merely conclude that from the perspective of
achieving more truthful reporting, strict ownership rules may not be the answer.
1453.5 Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 ,7 ,a n d8
Step 1: The decision maker’s problem
The decision maker’s problem is solved as follows. The decision maker selects
expert i’s report to read.
If the decision maker selects action R given an b r report (αi
e r =1 ), his payoﬀ is
U
DM =
p +( 1− p)σi
r
p +( 1− p)σi
r +( 1− p)(1− σi
l)
If the decision maker selects action L given an b r report (αi
e r =0 ), his payoﬀ is
U
DM =
(1 − p)(1− σi
l)
p +( 1− p)σi
r +( 1− p)(1− σi
l)
If the decision maker selects action L given an b l report, his payoﬀ is
U
DM =
p +( 1− p)σi
l
(1 − p)(1− σi
r)+p +( 1− p)σi
l
If the decision maker selects action R given an b l report, his payoﬀ is
U
DM =
(1 − p)(1− σi
r)
(1 − p)(1− σi
r)+p +( 1− p)σi
l
The decision maker’s best response is summarized below:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨








or if [2 − σi
l − σi
r]=0 ,t h e n αi









,t h e n αi









,t h e n αi
e r ∈ [0,1],α i
e l ∈ [0,1]
146Step 2: The strategic expert’s problem if the expert has a chance
of being selected by the decision maker
The expert’s utility is comprised of two parts: (1) when the decision maker
selects expert i’s report to read, (2) when the decision maker selects a diﬀerent
expert’s report to read.
Let V i(σj,ω= r) and V i(σj,ω= l) represent the expected utilities to expert
i when the decision maker selects another expert’s report to read given ω = r














not i is honest expert























not i is a deceitful, strategic expert
⎤













































⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
Suppose the strategic expert is receives an r signal. If she reports truthfully


























DM selects an expert who is not i

























Since expert i cannot aﬀect the outcome when the decision maker selects
someone else’s report to read, that part does not aﬀect his decision to be truthful.
The strategic expert’s best response given R is summarized below:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
If (1 + b)αi





,t h e n σi
r =1
If (1 + b)αi





,t h e n σi
r =0
If (1 + b)αi









⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨




e r − αi
e l
´
> 1 − αi
e r − αi





e r − αi
e l
´
< 1 − αi
e r − αi









e r − αi
e l,t h e n σi
r ∈ [0,1]
Recall that 1 − αi
e r − αi
e l ≤ 0 is assumed. When 1 − αi
e r − αi
e l < 0,t h eb e s t
response given R can be reduced to
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
If b>−1,t h e n σi
r =1
If b<−1,t h e n σi
r =0
If b =1 ,t h e n σi
r ∈ [0,1]
Since b>1 is assumed, the equilibrium behavior is σi
r =1 .
When 1 − αi
e r − αi
e l =0 , the best response given R can be reduced to
148⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
If 0 > 0,t h e n σi
r =1
If 0 < 0,t h e n σi
r =0
If 0=0 ,t h e n σi
r ∈ [0,1]
In this case, the equilibrium behavior is σi
r ∈ [0,1].
When expert i tells the truth by reporting b l given an l signal (σi
l =1 ), her



























The expert’s utility when she lies by reporting b r given an l signal (σi




























Since expert i cannot aﬀect the outcome when the decision maker selects
someone else’s report to read, that part does not aﬀect his decision to be truthful.
The expert’s best response function given an l signal is
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
If αi






e r +( 1− αi
e r) then σi
l =1
If αi






e r +( 1− αi
e r) then σi
l =0
If αi






e r +( 1− αi




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨




e r − αi
e l
´
> 1 − αi
e r − αi





e r − αi
e l
´
< 1 − αi
e r − αi









e r − αi
e l then σi
l ∈ [0,1]
149Recall that 1 − αi
e r − αi
e l ≤ 0 is assumed. When 1 − αi
e r − αi
e l < 0 ,t h eb e s t
response given L can be reduced to
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
If b<1 then σi
l =1
If b>1 then σi
l =0
If b =1 then σi
l ∈ [0,1]
Since b>1 is assumed, the equilibrium behavior is σi
l =0 .
When 1 − αi
e r − αi
e l =0 , the best response given R can be reduced to
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
If 0 > 0 then σi
l =1
If 0 < 0 then σi
l =0
If 0=0 then σi
l ∈ [0,1]
In this case, the equilibrium behavior is σi
l ∈ [0,1].
Step 3: The strategic expert’s problem in which the expert has no
chance of being selected
In the case when the strategic expert has no chance of being selected by the
decision maker, she is completely indiﬀerent in her reporting strategies. Since
her reports are never read, she cannot aﬀect her payoﬀ.
Step 4: The DM selects from the potentially honest group















In the potentially honest group p>0, while in the strategic for sure group
p =0 . Therefore, it is always better for the decision maker to select an expert
from the potentially honest group.
Step 5: The equilibria
1. The equilibrium of the subgame in which the expert belongs to the poten-
tially honest group is (σi
r =1 , σi
l =0 ), (αi
e r =1 ,α i
e l =1 ) and the decision
maker selects an expert from the potentially honest group.
2. The equilibrium of the subgame in which the expert belongs to the strategic
for sure group is (σi
r ∈ [0,1],σi
l ∈ [0,1]), (αi
e r =1 ,α i
e l =1 ) and the decision
maker selects an expert from the potentially honest group.
3. There exists a babbling equilibrium, (σi
r ∈ [0,1],σi
l ∈ [0,1])a n d( αi
e r ∈
[0,1],α i







and 1 − αi
e r − αi
e l =0 .
P r o o fo fL e m m a9








be the expected utility that expert i receives when the











⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
p0 (1 + b)α
j
e r | {z }
j is honest expert
+(1− p0)σ
j
r (1 + b)α
j
e r | {z }














j is deceitful, strategic expert
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
Given ω0 = r,i fe x p e r ti reports truthfully today (σi












[(1 + b)αe r,0]
| {z }


































p1 (b − 1)
¸¸
| {z }
Next period’s payoﬀ if expert i remains in potentially honest group












































p1 (b − 1)
¸¸
Given ω0 = r, if the expert reports dishonestly today (σi















1 − αe l,0
´i
| {z }












0,ω 0 = r
¢
| {z }










Next period’s payoﬀsi fe x p e r ti is excluded from the potentially honest group





















































































1 − αe l,0
´i¸
Since the payoﬀs in the next period, t =1 , is clearly better if you tell the
truth in t =0 , let’s focus attention on the payoﬀso ft h eﬁrst period.
In t =0 , the expert is comparing
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
If − b
³
1 − αe r,1 − αe l,1
´
> 1 − αe r,1 − αe l,1,t h e n σr,1 =1
If − b
³
1 − αe r,1 − αe l,1
´
< 1 − αe r,1 − αe l,1,t h e n σr,1 =0
If − b
³
1 − αe r,1 − αe l,1
´
=1− αe r,1 − αe l,1,t h e n σr,1 ∈ [0,1]
When b>1, this reduces to
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
If
³
1 − αe r,1 − αe l,1
´
< 0,t h e n σr,1 =1
If
³
1 − αe r,1 − αe l,1
´
> 0,t h e n σr,1 =0
If
³
1 − αe r,1 − αe l,1
´
=0 ,t h e n σr,1 ∈ [0,1]
S i n c ei ti sa s s u m e dt h a t
³
1 − αe r,1 − αe l,1
´
≤ 0, the only equilibrium strategy
in pure strategies is σr,1 =1 .
154Suppose all strategic experts report r signals truthfully (σr,0 =1 ).
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨











=0 ,t h e n αi







,t h e n αi







,t h e n αi
e r,0 ∈ [0,1],α i
e l,0 ∈ [0,1]
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 6
It is an equilibrium for all strategic experts to adopt a mixed strategy given






















































If all strategic experts play the same mixed strategy σi

















































































































⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣





(np0 +1− p0)(1− p0)

















⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
p0 (np0 +1− p0)
+[(2p0 (n − 1) + 1)(1 − p0)]σi
l,0












⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣




























⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
−[(2p0 (n − 1) + 1)(1 − p0)]
±
v u u u u u t
((2p0 (n − 1) + 1)(1 − p0))
2
−4(n − 1)(1 − p0)
2 ¡





⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
2(n − 1)(1 − p0)
2
=
−2p0 (n − 1) − 1 ±
p
2p0δn(n − 1) + 1
2(n − 1)(1 − p0)
=
−2p0 (n − 1) − 2+2 n +1− 2n ±
p
2p0δn(n − 1) + 1
2(n − 1)(1 − p0)
=
2(n − 1)(1 − p0)+1− 2n ±
p
2p0δn(n − 1) + 1
2(n − 1)(1 − p0)
=1 +
1 − 2n ±
p
2p0δn(n − 1) + 1
2(n − 1)(1 − p0)
In order to ensure that the square root term is real, let’s double check to
see that the value under the square root (that is, (2p0δn(n − 1) + 1))i sn o n -
negative. Notice that (2p0δn(n − 1) + 1) > 0 for all of the parameter domains
of the model, p0 ∈ [0,1], δ ∈ [0,1], n ≥ 1. Additionally, it is necessary to select
the (+), rather than the (−), in the (±).
For σi




1 − 2n +
p
2p0δn(n − 1) + 1
2(n − 1)(1 − p0)
≤ 1
−1 ≤
1 − 2n +
p
2p0δn(n − 1) + 1
2(n − 1)(1 − p0)
≤ 0






1 − 2n +
p
2p0δn(n − 1) + 1
2(n − 1)(1 − p0)
−2(n − 1)(1 − p0) ≤ 1 − 2n +
p
2p0δn(n − 1) + 1
(2np0 − 2p0 +1 )












2δp0 − 2nδp0 +1
−n
2δ + nδ ≤− 2n +2− 2p0 +4 np0 − 2n
2p0
−δn(n − 1) ≤ (−2)(n − 1)(p0 (n − 1) + 1)




(p0 (n − 1) + 1)





If δ ≥ δ
∗,t h e n0 ≤ σi
l,0.




2(n−1)(1−p0) ≤ 0.S i n c e t h e
denominator is strictly positive for n>1 and p0 < 1, only consider the numerator.
1581 − 2n +
p
2p0δn(n − 1) + 1 ≤ 0
p
2p0δn(n − 1) + 1 ≤ 2n − 1
2p0δn(n − 1) + 1 ≤ (2n − 1)
2
2p0δn(n − 1) ≤ 4n
2 − 4n




This condition is satisﬁed for all p0 ∈ (0,1] and all δ ∈ [0,1].




1 − 2n +
p
2p0δn(n − 1) + 1












1 − 2n +
p
2p0δn(n − 1) + 1
2(n − 1)(1 − p0)
!
Let g = −2n +1+
p
2p0δn(n − 1) + 1 and h =2( n − 1)(1 − p0)








[2p0δn(n − 1) + 1]
−1




2p0δn(n − 1) + 1
h =2 ( n − 1)(1 − p0)
∂h
∂n



































−2(n − 1) +
p0δ(2n−1) √
2p0δn(n−1)+1 (n − 1)
+2n − 1 −
p











2p0δn(n − 1) + 1
2(n − 1)






2p0δn(n − 1) + 1 + p0δ(2n − 1)(n − 1)





2 (1 − p0)
p
2p0δn(n − 1) + 1
=
−(p0δ(n − 1) + 1) +
p
2p0δn(n − 1) + 1
2(n − 1)
2 (1 − p0)
p
2p0δn(n − 1) + 1
160The denominator is a positive value. Now to show that
∂σi
l,0
∂n > 0, I need to
show that the numerator is positive.




−(p0δ(n − 1) + 1)
+
p





2p0δn(n − 1) + 1 > (p0δ(n − 1) + 1)
2p0δn(n − 1) + 1 > (p0δ(n − 1) + 1)
2
2n




















































The expression p0δ(n − 1)
2 (δp0 − 2) is negative, because p0δ(n − 1)
2 > 0 and
(δp0 − 2) < 0 for the parameter values of the model (p0 > 0, δ>0,a n dn>1).













1 − 2n +
p
2p0δn(n − 1) + 1





2(n − 1)(1 − p0)+1− 2n +
p
2p0δn(n − 1) + 1


















































2p0δn(n − 1) + 1
4(n − 1)










2p0δn(n − 1) + 1
4(n − 1)




















































2n − 1 −
p
2(0)δn(n − 1) + 1
2(n − 1)(1 − 0)
=1 −














2n − 1 −
p
2(p0)δn(n − 1) + 1




P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y6
δ

























P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 8
Suppose σi
l,0 =1for all i =1 ,2,...n is equilibrium behavior.
If σi






















































l,0 =1for all i =1 ,2,...n is equilibrium behavior, then
s
−i


















































e l,0 + α
i









e l,0 + α
i
e r,0 − 1
´
(3.3)
By Lemma (??), αi
e l,0 = αi




which can never be satisﬁed for any p0 ∈ (0,1] and any δ ∈ [0,1].
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